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ABSTRACT 
Given recent calls for advancing valid instrumentation in the field of 
cyberaggression, the present study evaluated construct validity and measurement 
invariance for the Cyberbullying Experiences Survey (CES) in a high school and college 
student sample. A series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA), reliability analyses, and 
a nomological net evaluation were conducted to address these aims. The data did not 
provide support for the hypothesized four-factor model for cyberaggression or 
cybervictimization (i.e., unwanted contact, malice, deception, and public humiliation). 
Upon implementing suggested and theoretically supported modification indices, support 
for a four-factor solution for both cyberaggression and cybervictimization was provided.  
To subsequently evaluate measurement invariance, single-group CFAs were 
constructed to test invariance of the four-factor structure across college and high school 
students. Results provided support for the four-factor model solution of cyberaggression 
and cybervictimization in the college sample but not in the high school sample. Two 
cyberaggression subscales (i.e., unwanted contact and deception) correlated at r = .99, 
indicating the potential for multicollinearity, and incremental fit indices for the 
cybervictimization model solution did not meet recommended cut-off values in the high 
school sample. Revised model results based on statistical and theoretical considerations 
evaluated a restructured three-factor solution for cyberaggression (i.e., “sexual,” “direct,” 
and “coercion”) and cybervictimization (i.e., “sexual,” “direct,” and “defamation”). Fit 
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indices provided initial support for the revised model solution for both CES 
cyberaggression items (College: MLM χ2 (163) = 273.01, RMSEA = .04, CFI = .92, 
SRMR = .06; High School: MLM χ2 (165) = 196.29, RMSEA = .03, CFI = .96, SRMR = 
.08) and cybervictimization items (College: MLM χ2 (163) = 367.81, RMSEA = .05, CFI 
= .93, SRMR = .06; High School: MLM χ2 (160) = 256.32, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .92, 
SRMR = .07).  
Utilizing the revised factor solution for the remaining analyses, the CES displayed 
evidence for internal consistency reliability across college (cyberaggression items: α = 
.83; cybervictimization items: α = .89) and high school (cyberaggression items: α = .88; 
cybervictimization items: α = .90), although internal consistencies for the CES 
cyberaggression subscales ranged from poor to good (α = .54 - .88) and acceptable to 
excellent (α = .76 - .92) for the CES cybervictimization subscales across both college and 
high school samples. Evidence for convergent validity with theoretically similar 
constructs was mixed. Specific areas of model misspecification as well as directions for 
future cyberaggression measurement research and policy are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Electronic technology has become increasingly used as an interface to 
communicate among adolescents and young adults. With these new mechanisms for 
communication (e.g., texting, e-mailing, social networking sites), novel forms of 
aggressive behavior are emerging. In particular, cyberaggression has received growing 
attention from both researchers and behavioral health professionals. In a recent meta-
analysis, Modecki et al. (2014) reported the prevalence rates of cyberaggression to be 
15.5% among adolescents 12-18 years old. Similar prevalence rates have been observed 
among college students (5-15%; Schenk & Fremouw, 2012; Schenk, Fremouw & Keelan, 
2013; Wensley & Campbell, 2012). Public health concerns surrounding cyberaggression 
have concurrently risen in response to numerous highly publicized national and 
international cases (Tokunaga, 2010). Cyberaggression has been linked with negative 
behavioral health correlates such as depression and suicidal ideation (e.g., Landoll et al., 
2015; Schenk et al., 2013). Populations who are more vulnerable to experiencing 
traditional face-to-face aggression or bullying, such as military connected youth (Atuel et 
al., 2014; Gilreath et al., 2013), may also be at an increased risk for experiencing 
cyberaggressive behavior, though these investigations are limited or nonexistent. 
 Despite its prevalence and psychological impact (Cassidy, Faucher, & Jackson, 
2013), a uniform definition of cyberaggression has yet to be established (Tokunaga, 
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2010). A variety of terms have been described in the literature (e.g., cyberaggression, 
cyberbullying, cyberharassment; Berne et al., 2013) to represent negative interactions via 
electronic communication. Other investigations have demonstrated varying 
interpretations of cyberaggression between middle/high school students and college 
students (Baldasare, Bauman, Goldman, & Robie, 2012; Grigg, 2010), pointing to 
potential distinctions in how cyberaggression may be operationalized across age groups. 
Research in this field is limited given the lack of consensus on the conceptualization of 
this construct, however, and the measurement and assessment of cyberaggression has 
been affected. Without sound conceptualization and measurement, furthering research 
that has the potential to inform clinical practice and policy, such as evaluating how 
cyberaggression impacts various groups and vulnerable populations, will remain 
hindered. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to inform the literature by providing 
additional exploration into the psychometric properties of a novel scale, the 
Cyberbullying Experiences Survey (CES; Doane, Kelley, Chiang, & Padilla, 2013). The 
original psychometric investigation of the CES provided initial evidence for construct 
validity (Doane et al., 2013).  
The current study seeks to extend evaluation of the instrument and of 
cyberaggression across sociodemographics via three aims. First, in light of nationally and 
internationally recognized issues of rigor and reproducibility (McNutt, 2014), we seek to 
evaluate evidence for construct validity of the CES using a novel sample of high school 
and college students. Second, we seek to examine aspects of measurement invariance of 
the CES across age (i.e., high school and college) as these issues have yet to explored as 
well as considering prior qualitative research suggesting varying conceptualizations of 
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aggressive behaviors across developmental periods (Card, 2013). Finally, given 
inconsistent findings concerning prevalence rates and impact of cyberaggression across 
demographic characteristics, a tertiary aim of our study seeks to provide additional 
evidence for cyberaggression experiences among race/ethnic status, sex, and military-
connected youth as research has suggested these youth to be at increased risk for 
experiencing negative peer interactions (Atuel, et al., 2014; Gilreath et al., 2013). We 
begin our investigation by reviewing the current literature base of definitions, theories, 
and sociodemographic perspectives on cyberaggression, as well as review psychometric 
evidence of cyberaggression instrumentation. Results from our study and implications for 
future research, clinical-community practice, and policy will then be presented. 
1.1 DEFINTIONS AND THEORIES OF CYBERAGGRESSION 
 1.1.1 The Problem The first task in novel fields of inquiry is to conceptually and 
operationally define the primary constructs of interest. The purpose of a definition is said 
to specify the essence of a term and to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
something to be a member of the construct being defined (Bauman, 2013). Definitions 
provide the foundation for measurement and instruments which are developed for 
research investigations and clinical applications. It is therefore difficult to appropriately 
evaluate and generalize findings across investigations without consistent terminology.  
 The field of cyberaggression is inundated with inconsistency in both the terms 
used to describe negative behaviors utilizing electronic forms of communication, as well 
as in the attempts to measure such behavior (Berne et al., 2013; Tokunaga, 2010). 
Numerous terms including, but not limited to, cyberaggression, cyberbullying, 
cyberharassment, cyberstalking, internet harassment, and cyber targeting (e.g., Berne et 
al., 2013; Ybarra, 2013) have been referenced in the literature. Some researchers (e.g., 
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Hinduja & Patchin, 2014; Ybarra, 2013; Ybarra & Mitchell, 2004) distinguish between 
cyberharassment (single incidents of electronic aggression) and cyberbullying (repeated 
incidents). Although attempts have been made to measure each of these individually 
named constructs, recent reviews have suggested that the majority of current instruments 
actually attempt to measure cyberaggression (Bauman, Underwood, & Card, 2013). 
Given the prevailing use of the term “cyberbullying” in society to refer to the range of 
behaviors referenced above, the remainder of this section will evaluate the legitimacy of 
recent definitions of cyberbullying. Informed by various theoretical perspectives and 
critical differences in the face-to-face versus cyber realms, concerns in defining criteria 
for cyberbullying will be identified and proposed reasons for alternatively using and 
defining cyberaggression to address cohesion among researchers in the field will be 
argued.  
 1.1.2 Cyberbullying and Traditional Bullying In the beginning stages of 
research in this field, the original coined term to conceptualize negative interactions via 
electronic communication was cyberbullying. The original definition stated that 
cyberbullying “involves the use of information and communication technologies to 
support deliberate, repeated, and hostile behavior by an individual or group that is 
intended to harm others” (Bauman, 2013). More recently, Smith et al. (2008) defined 
cyberbullying as “an aggressive, intentional act carried out by a group or individual, 
using electronic forms of contact, repeatedly and over time against a victim who cannot 
easily defend him or herself.” These definitions inherently rely on the original 
conceptualization of traditional, face-to-face bullying (Olweus, 1993) and simply 
integrate the novel modality of electronic forms of communication to express behaviors.  
5 
 
 Although aspects of traditional bullying may be observed in the cyber realm, they 
necessarily differ due to distinct properties of electronic communication. An evaluation 
of how the proposed criteria for traditional bullying (i.e., intent to harm, repetition, and 
power imbalance as defined by Olweus, 1993) may differentially operate in the cyber 
realm through several theoretical perspectives will inform our discussion. First 
considering the criterion of intent to harm, it is generally difficult to determine intent in a 
bullying situation. That is, intent may only be determined if the perpetrator has admitted 
to premeditated aggression or if the victim perceives that intent to harm was present. In 
cyber situations, intent might be particularly difficult to observe. A common example 
used to support this assertion considers a texting conversation via phone in which one 
individual sends a text that is interpreted by another individual in a negative manner. The 
sender, however, had no intention to upset the other individual and without the context of 
vocal tone and facial expressions which are provided in face-to-face interactions, the 
sender was unable to effectively communicate that there was no intention to harm on 
their behalf. In legal proceedings, phrases such as the reasonable person standard are 
often applied to consider whether a hypothetical person who exercises average skill and 
judgment in conduct would consider whether intent was present to determine liability 
(Smith, del Barrio, & Tokunaga, 2013). Although practical in some areas, the ambiguity 
provided in the cyber realm and by other practices for determining intent is not sufficient 
for empirical investigation. Moreover, social information processing theory posits that 
aggression is largely due to impairment in social problem solving. Utilizing ambiguous 
situations such as in the provided example, researchers have recently attempted to 
discover whether cyberbullying is largely proactive or reactive in nature (Dooley, 
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Pyzalski, & Cross, 2009). The nature of the cyberbullying act, whether proactive or 
reactive and whether it can be determined, will likely impact how the information is 
processed, what attributions are made about the perpetrator, and what behavior ultimately 
emerges from them (Espelage, Rao, & Craven, 2013).  
Regarding the criterion of repetition, it is often noted that repetition in traditional 
bullying is demonstrated by multiple acts of bullying directed towards the victim by the 
perpetrator. Although applicable in the cyber realm, repetition may operate quite 
differently. For example, repetition might be met either through the literal repetition of 
harmful behaviors or through the number of times a negative post, picture, or video is 
viewed by third-party witnesses (Dooley et al., 2009; Tokunaga, 2010). Social learning 
theory suggests that aggressive behavior is posited to be a consequence of exposure to 
socially deviant role models and inappropriate reinforcement of maladaptive behaviors 
(Bandura, 1977). Applying this perspective to the cyber realm may consider third-party 
viewers on social networking sites “liking” a post of an embarrassing picture of a 
cybervictim (Espelage et al., 2013). This reinforcement of negative online behavior could 
additionally be viewed as a form of repetition in that other individuals are more or less 
supporting an act of cyberbullying. 
The third criterion, an established power imbalance, may likewise be context 
specific in the cyber realm. In traditional bullying, a power imbalance may refer to 
differences in physical or social status between a perpetrator and victim which make it 
challenging for a victim to respond in an effective manner (Cassidy, Faucher, & Jackson, 
2013). In the cyber realm, these distinctions may be diminished. A perpetrator, for 
example, may not necessarily be physically stronger or more socially connected as 
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electronic interactions provide protections from physical retaliations. A more context-
specific example considers the technological know-how and internet and communication 
technology skills of the perpetrator as compared to the victim (Smith, del Barrio, & 
Tokunaga, 2013). Two other properties of cyber communication may provide a power 
imbalance: anonymity and the 24/7 nature of electronic communication. It is more 
difficult to effectively respond if a cybervictim does not know the identity of the 
perpetrator, and it might be challenging to avoid receiving negative electronic 
communication as a result of the permanent status of posts or pictures online. These 
context-specific aspects of cyberbullying relate to a recently proposed theory entitled the 
online disinhibition effect (Suler, 2004), which refers to diminished internal censorship 
when communicating in the cyber realm.  That is, individuals may choose to interact with 
others anonymously and therefore avoid the repercussions by the cybervictim that might 
accompany the bad behaviors if their identity was known (Espelage, Rao, & Craven, 
2013). Knowing that the cyber realm offers this form of protection, youth may say or do 
things via electronic communication that they are more unlikely to do in face-to-face 
encounters and to limit their sense of responsibility for these actions (Blumenfield, 2005). 
1.1.3 The Argument for Cyberaggression Several points have been presented to 
identify limitations in the utility of the term cyberbullying and attempting to define it in 
connection with proposed traditional bullying criteria (Olweus, 1993). It is apparent that 
the initial criteria utilized to define cyberbullying contain numerous context-specific 
intricacies which hinder the ability to develop robust instrumentation to measure this 
construct. Recent qualitative research (e.g., Grigg, 2010) has further investigated the 
utility of the term cyberbullying and has identified an issue as to whether children or 
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young people use, or recognize, the term cyberbullying, as well as, what terms they use to 
describe this behavior. Through a qualitative triangulation methodological approach, 
Grigg (2010) noted several limitations to the construct of cyberbullying including that the 
term is vague, inadequate, and restricted for the variety of negative behaviors which may 
occur via electronic media. Focus group participants further agreed that cyberaggression 
holds more utility as a construct as it represents a wider range of behaviors (Grigg, 2010). 
In practice, the majority of the literature base uses the term “cyberbullying” in 
research articles. Some suggest that many studies actually measure cyberaggression, 
however, since they do not systematically include measures of imbalance of power or 
repetition which are required for a cyberbullying event to occur (Smith, del Barrio, & 
Tokunaga, 2013). It has therefore been recommended that given the inconsistency of 
terms and difficulty in applying complex criteria to define cyberbullying, the field should 
shift its focus towards examining cyberaggression (Bauman, Underwood, & Card, 2013). 
In addition, given how electronic forms of contact have changed and are continuously 
evolving, utilizing a broader term such as cyberaggression may best capture the variety of 
negative interactions via electronic communication among youth. Taking a broader 
approach by evaluating cyberaggression is similar to traditional aggression literature in 
that bullying, among other forms of aggression (e.g., stalking, harassment, etc.), are 
subsumed under a broader aggression construct (Smith, del Barrio, & Tokunaga, 2013). 
We do not suggest removing “cyberbullying” from the literature as it may represent a 
specific type of cyberaggression; we are emphasizing that the field must first come to an 
agreement on what construct it is attempting to measure and use consistent terminology 
to better facilitate future intervention and policy efforts. 
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Given these recommendations, the present investigation will refer to the primary 
construct of interest as cyberaggression. A recent and well-known definition of 
cyberaggression offered by Schoffstall and Cohen (2011) states:  
Cyberaggression: intentional behavior aimed at harming another person or 
persons though computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices, and 
perceived as aversive by the victim. 
It is recommended that future definitions of cyberaggression include explicit language 
pertaining to the act being perpetrated via software or digital applications available 
through computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices, to avoid any 
misinterpretation that cyberaggression could be defined through physical (e.g., throwing 
a cell phone at someone) usage of electronic devices. 
1.2 CYBERAGGRESSION INSTRUMENTATION 
Considering the lack of consensus regarding a uniform definition and consistent 
use of terminology, the field is currently at a stage where no gold-standard assessment 
measure exists (Berne et al., 2013; Card, 2013; Ybarra, 2011). The majority of current 
instrumentation measures the frequency of cyberaggressive behavior either perpetrated or 
experienced over a specified time period (Berne et al., 2013). This form of measurement 
warrants notice given the array of terms used to describe the same behavior and the 
specific criteria proposed for cyberbullying. That is, current instrumentation which is said 
to be measuring cyberbullying is in reality measuring cyberaggression because there are 
often no items representing the criteria of repetition and power imbalance (Bauman, 
Underwood, & Card, 2013; Smith, Barrio, & Tokunaga, 2013). To further highlight this 
issue, Table 1.1 provides examples of items from two instruments contending to measure 
cyberbullying (Cyberbullying Experiences Questionnaire (CES), Doane et al., 2013;  
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Table 1.1 
Item Comparisons between the CES, RCBI, and C-PEQ 
 
CES Cyberbullying 
Subscale (Report 
behaviors that occurred 
in the past year) 
RCBI Cyberbullying Subscale 
(Have often have you done the 
instances described to others?) 
C-PEQ Cyberaggression 
Subscale (I…via 
electronic media) 
 
Have you sent a rude 
message to someone 
electronically? 
 
Have you sent an 
unwanted nude or 
partially nude picture to 
someone electronically? 
 
Have you posted a picture 
of someone electronically 
that they did not want 
others to see? 
 
Sending threatening and/or 
hurtful text messages 
 
 
Published online an 
embarrassing photo without 
permission 
 
 
Sharing private internet 
conversations without the 
other’s knowledge (such as 
chatting with a friend on Skype 
with other(s) in the room) 
 
 
…posted mean things 
about a peer publicly… 
 
 
…posted pictures of a 
peer that made him/her 
look bad… 
 
 
…publicly spread 
rumors about a peer or 
revealed secrets he/she 
had told me… 
 
 
Revised Cyberbullying Inventory (RCBI), Topcu & Erdur-Baker, 2010) and one 
instrument contending to measure cyberaggression (Cyber-Peer Experiences 
Questionnaire (C-PEQ), Landoll et al., 2015). As shown, item content across all three 
instruments is markedly similar and no instruments include items specifically designed to 
assess the complexities of power imbalance or repetition in the cyber realm which are 
recommended to fully evaluate the construct of cyberbullying. With such similar item 
content across a multitude of existing instruments, it is defensible that for the field to 
progress, developing additional instruments may not necessarily inform the current 
knowledge base. Instead, expanding upon psychometric evidence of existing measures is 
more readily needed. In the only known psychometric review in this field, Berne et al. 
(2013) presented an overview of existing cyberbullying and related instruments by 
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investigating characteristics and psychometric properties of 44 various instruments. 
Though presented as a review of “cyberbullying instruments,” the authors acknowledge 
that half of the instruments reviewed were not specified to measure cyberbullying 
explicitly and instead targeted related constructs (e.g., cyberaggression, internet 
harassment). 
Berne et al. (2013) provided information regarding the instruments’ internal 
consistencies and convergent validity, as well as whether structural analyses (such as 
exploratory or confirmatory factor analyses) had previously been performed. Supporting 
psychometric evidence for the 44 instruments reviewed was scarce. Factor analysis 
(inclusive of both exploratory and confirmatory) had been conducted for only 12 
instruments. The failure to include such analyses implores the question of how the 
instruments effectively operationalized their respective constructs. Only 18 out of the 44 
instruments reported internal consistency reliability and reports of instrument validity 
were likewise limited (24 out of the 44 instruments), with convergent validity being the 
only form tested in the publications. Several additional instruments have been published 
and examined since the Berne et al. (2013) review including the Cyberbullying 
Experiences Survey (Doane et al., 2013), Cyber – Peer Experiences Questionnaire 
(Landoll et al., 2015), Cyberbullying Scale (Stewart, Drescher, Maack, Ebesutani, & 
Young, 2014), and E-Victimization Scale and E-Bullying Scale (Lam & Li, 2013). 
Overall, these investigations reported preliminary psychometric evidence for all 
measures.  
1.2.1 Methods for Expanding Psychometric Evidence Exploring empirically 
supported methods for evaluating psychometric evidence of existing measures may 
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inform the research gap of limited psychometric evidence of cyberaggression 
instrumentation. Benson (1998) describes a three-component procedure to evaluate 
construct validity for newly developed instruments which involves the following: 1) 
substantive, 2) structural, and 3) external components. The substantive component 
concerns how the construct of interest, in our case cyberaggression, is defined, both 
theoretically and empirically (Benson, 1998). Though the theoretical literature has yet to 
provide a substantial evidence base for the number of latent factors that may comprise the 
cyberaggression construct, our review does suggest that cyberaggression and 
cybervictimization are unique from similar constructs such as relational or physical 
aggression/victimization (e.g., Landoll et al., 2015). Thus, further exploration into the 
second aspect of Benson’s (1998) program is warranted.   
The structural component of Benson’s (1998) method refers to the internal 
consistency of the set of observed variables, or how the set of observed variables co-vary 
and share common variance. Several statistical procedures can be utilized for assessing 
the structural component, including inter-correlations between items and subscales, 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, and item response theory. One advantage 
of using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is that it complements the substantive 
component of the strong program and allows researchers to rule out other factor models 
in favor of the hypothesized model (Benson, 1998).  
In the original investigation of the Cyberbullying Experiences Survey (CES), 
Doane et al. (2013) initially conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using 
weighted least squares with mean and variance adjusted Promax rotation to extrapolate 
the factors and permit them to correlate. Results revealed three factors for a posited 
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cybervictimization subscale and two factors for a posited cyberbullying perpetration 
subscale. The authors, however, posited a four-factor structure (i.e., unwanted contact, 
malice, deception, and public humiliation) for both subscales solely for interpretability 
purposes without providing theoretical justification (Doane et al., 2013).  
During the second phase of their investigation, a CFA was conducted to test for 
the purported four-factor structure on both the cyberbullying perpetration and 
cybervictimization subscales. Initial results for the cybervictimization subscale indicated 
mediocre fit based on appropriate fit indices (comparative fit index [CFI], Tucker-Lewis 
index [TLI], and root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA]; Doane et al., 2013; 
Hu & Bentler, 1999). The authors subsequently invoked modification indices, which 
estimate the amount by which the model’s overall χ2 statistic would decrease if a 
particular parameter were freely estimated (Kline, 1998). This resulted in the removal of 
six items which exhibited cross loadings on the subscale. A similar procedure was 
completed for improving overall model fit of the posited four-factor structure of the 
cyberbullying perpetration subscale; this procedure resulted in the removal of one item 
that exhibited a cross loading. The final CFA model results posited a four-factor structure 
for the cyberbullying perpetration subscale: χ2 (52) = 185.97, p < .001; CFI = .97, TLI = 
.99, RMSEA = .06 and cybervictimization subscale: χ2 (73) = 447.89, p < .001; CFI = 
.91, TLI = .98, RMSEA = .09).  
Positive results obtained from the structural component lend evidence of the 
necessary condition for establishing construct validity but does not meet sufficient 
condition criteria (Nunnally, 1978). That is, all three components are necessary for robust 
evaluation of construct validity. Arguably the most crucial component, the external 
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component, establishes divergence among item responses on the instrument and related 
but not redundant domains. For example, by showing how an instrument measuring 
cyberaggression and cybervictimization is related to constructs on other measures (i.e., a 
nomological net), evidence for the uniqueness of the constructs of interest are provided. 
Common procedures for assessing the external component consist of zero-order 
correlations between a scale’s items as well as structural equation modeling (Benson, 
1998). In the original psychometric investigation of the CES, initial convergent validity 
evidence was observed in that the CES cyberbullying and cybervictimization subscales 
moderately correlated with respective subscales on two other cyberbullying and 
cybervictimization instruments (r = .21-.41; Doane et al., 2013). To develop a broader 
nomological net for the CES, several other instruments measuring latent constructs 
thought to be related to cyberaggression or cybervictimization will be included in our 
investigation. A logical inclusion involves other measures assessing cyberaggression, 
cybervictimization, and other forms of aggression (e.g., relational and peer aggression), 
as prior research has shown that cyberaggression, cybervictimization, and relational 
aggression are correlated. Fanti and colleagues (2012) reported that cyberaggression and 
cybervictimization strongly correlated (r = .67). Hemphill et al. (2013) similarly found a 
moderate correlation between relational aggression and cyberaggression/ 
cybervictimization, and Landoll et al. (2015) found cybervictimization to be moderately 
correlated (r = .39-.56) with overt and relational peer victimization. Furthermore, a 
measure of behavioral health and well-being was included to investigate convergent 
validity evidence for the CES’s cybervictimization items. Prior research has discovered 
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associations between cybervictimization, depression, and anxiety (Lam & Li, 2013; 
Landoll et al., 2013, 2015). 
1.3 DEVELOPMENTAL AND SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES  
 1.3.1 The Problem In view of the limitations in this field concerning a uniform 
definition, terminology used, and lack of empirically supported psychometric evaluations 
of existing measures, inquiries into how cyberaggression differentially operates between 
groups across various developmental and sociocultural indicators are hindered. This is 
problematic given the noted prevalence rates and public health concerns of 
cyberaggression among youth (Modecki et al., 2014; Tokunaga, 2010), as well as the 
need for further research into how cyberaggression may impact populations particularly 
vulnerable to experiencing face-to-face aggression such as military-connected youth 
(Atuel et al., 2014). This section serves to highlight prior investigations into how and/or 
why cyberaggression may differentially operate among various developmental and 
sociodemographic groups. An argument for extending evaluation of these potential group 
differences through robust statistical procedures to compliment Benson’s (1998) strong 
program of measurement will be presented. 
 1.3.2 Developmental Perspectives With the ever-changing technological and 
communicative landscape youth experience, exploring whether human development may 
impact how cyberaggression operates is warranted. Modern day adolescents and young 
adults have been immersed in a digital culture. These youth have developed a greater 
literacy and understanding of how the Internet and other forms of technology operate as 
well as the norms and social practices of digital communication (Lewis, 2015). As social 
interactions utilizing technology have become commonplace among youth, these 
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individuals may develop a tendency to not view the technology as technological 
(Lankshear, Snyder, & Green, 2000). For example, 92% of teenagers (defined as 13-17 
years old) and 88% of young adults (defined as 18-29) in the United States use the 
Internet, social networking sites, and other forms of technology (Greenwood, Perrin, & 
Duggan, 2016; Lenhart, 2015). As such, these forms of communication do not hold the 
fascination as being novel among young people (Lewis, 2015). Novel modalities of 
electronic communication and shifts in popularity among social networking sites 
(Lenhart, Purcell, Smith, & Zickuhr, 2010) are continuously changing, however. These 
transitions between forms of electronic communication necessarily impact technological 
literacy rates among youth which may contribute to a power imbalance among Internet 
users (Lewis, 2015). A power imbalance based on technological literacy may serve as a 
risk factor for experiencing cyberaggression (Smith, del Barrio, & Tokunaga, 2013). 
 Despite the majority of both adolescents and young adults utilizing electronic 
communication, the preponderance of the literature has examined how cyberaggression 
operates among middle and high school populations (Walker, Craven, & Tokunaga, 
2013). This developmental focus likely pertains to theories of face-to-face interactions 
among youth that posit a higher prevalence rate of aggressive and bullying behaviors at 
these ages as compared to young adult age groups (MacDonald et al., 2010; Schenk, 
Fremouw, & Keelan, 2013). Adolescence is a period of numerous physical, social, and 
interpersonal transformations. Stress from these changes often elicits the development of 
ineffective coping mechanisms and engagement in risky behaviors such as substance use 
and aggression (Seiffge-Krenke, 2013). Heightened risk-taking during adolescence is also 
likely to be normative, biologically driven, and, to some extent, inevitable (Steinberg, 
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2008). It is therefore plausible that adolescents may also enact more risk-taking and 
aggressive behaviors in the cyber realm. Connecting with aspects of the online 
disinhibition effect (Suler, 2004) and properties of electronic communication which may 
decrease accountability and social responsibility, the Internet and other modes of 
technology may serve as an effective vessel for adolescents to express negative social 
interactions. 
 Research has indicated that forms of aggression do not necessarily decrease in 
university settings (Wensley & Campbell, 2012). Numerous studies have reported that 
subtypes of aggression including physical aggression, relational aggression, and sexual 
aggression are consistently prevalent among both male and female college student 
populations (Dahlen, Czar, Prather, & Dyess, 2013; Hines & Saudino, 2003). Rates of 
cyberaggression have also been shown to be similar among high school and college 
students (Modecki et al., 2014; Schenk & Fremouw, 2012; Schenk, Fremouw & Keelan, 
2013; Wensley & Campbell, 2012). Overall, the limited data available suggest that the 
relation between age and cyberaggression follows a quadratic function, where prevalence 
rates are initially low, increase until mid-teenage years, and then begin to decrease again 
over time (Dooley, Cross, Hearn, & Treyvaud, 2009; Walker, Craven, & Tokunaga, 
2013).  
Given similarities in both prevalence rates and forms of negative peer interactions 
among adolescents and college students, furthering evaluation of how cyberaggression 
operates among high school and college student populations is warranted. Investigations 
have consistently demonstrated that participating in cyberaggression (i.e., as a 
perpetrator, victim, or perpetrator-victim) results in numerous impacts on behavioral 
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health such as increasing risk for depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideation among both 
high school and college students (e.g., Landoll et al., 2015; Schenk et al., 2013). 
Qualitative investigations have highlighted that college students believe cyberaggression 
to be of greater concern among high school populations, however, likely due to its 
association with bullying in the extant literature and media portrayal of the issue 
(Baldasare et al., 2012). Perhaps college student populations do not perceive 
cyberaggression to be relevant or know how cyberaggression manifests and how it 
impacts behavioral health. Further inquiry into how cyberaggression may differentially 
operate across these particular age groups may inform our investigations into a strong 
program of measurement. 
 1.3.3 Sociodemographic Perspectives: Sex In addition to how cyberaggression 
may operate differentially across two distinct periods of the human lifespan, considering 
sociodemographic variables such as sex, race/ethnicity as well as other culturally 
vulnerable populations may also hold utility. In research pertaining to traditional forms of 
aggression, it has been generally accepted that males exhibit more physical (overt) forms 
of aggression whereas females exhibit verbal and relational (covert) forms of aggression 
(e.g., Campbell, 2007). In a recent review article, Tokunaga (2010) reported that the 
majority of research to date has found no differences between males and females in their 
experiences of cyberaggression. A minority of studies have concluded sex to be a 
significant predictor of cyberaggression in that females are disproportionately at risk of 
being victimized (Tokunaga, 2010); other investigations have observed the opposite, 
however (e.g., Fanti, Demetriou, & Hawa, 2012). These contradictory findings may be 
informed by cultural risk factors that are present for both sexes. For example, male youth 
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are more likely to report less social support from family or friends as well as be exposed 
to higher levels of media violence due to television and video gaming (Fanti, Demetriou, 
& Hawa, 2012). On the other hand, research has demonstrated that females tend to 
interact more via electronic communication (e.g., e-mail, text messaging), which may 
predispose females to becoming cyberaggressors or cybervictims as a function of usage 
of the Internet and other forms of social media (Dooley, Pyżalski, & Cross, 2009). 
 It is likewise important to highlight how traditional gender norms may impact 
cyberaggression perpetration and victimization experiences. Male youth are more likely 
to become perpetrators and victims of traditional aggression through overt means 
(Dooley, Pyżalski, & Cross, 2009). Normative views on male behavior in the United 
States place expectations for males to display dominance (Addis & Mahalik, 2003; 
Archer, 2004), which may even encourage outwards displays of aggression. 
Cyberaggression, by definition, has been posited to be a covert form of aggression as 
physical presence or a power imbalance is not as necessary to act aggressively via 
electronic communication (Dooley et al., 2009; Spears, Slee, Owens, & Johnson, 2009). 
Perhaps cyberaggression does not align with masculine forms of aggression as expected 
from gender norms for male behavior. In connection with the aforementioned cultural 
risk factors males are more likely to experience (i.e., less likely to seek help and support 
from friends and family and predisposal to greater media violence; Addis & Mahalik, 
2003), males may be particularly vulnerable to negative outcomes after experiencing a 
cyberaggressive act. 
 Cultural norms in the United States drastically differ for females as they are not 
encouraged to exhibit overt aggression derived from expectations of proper feminine 
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etiquette (Archer, 2004). Boulton, Lloyd, Down, and Marx (2012) explored perceptions 
on aggressive behaviors between female and male youth. Expected sex differences were 
observed, with females expressing significantly less accepting attitudes towards 
aggressive behavior and bullying perpetrators and expressed higher rates of acceptance 
towards victims across all bullying subtypes. Cyberaggression may perhaps be perceived 
as a more acceptable form of aggressive behavior for females because it is historically 
viewed as covert in nature as compared to overt aggression. Thus, it may be possible that 
double-standard gender roles exist and influence female perceptions and attitudes towards 
face-to-face aggression and cyberaggression where cyberaggression is viewed as a more 
appropriate form of aggressive behavior among females. In addition, and as noted, 
females use electronic forms of communication more frequently than males (Dooley, 
Pyżalski, & Cross, 2009) and reports have indicated that females were more likely to 
experience certain forms of cyberaggression such as gender-based harassment, exclusion, 
and having personal information about them posted online (Cassidy, Faucher, & Jackson, 
2013). Reported outcomes from these experiences for females include feeling like their 
reputation was affected, making it harder to establish new friendships, as well as suicidal 
ideation.  
  1.3.4 Sociodemographic Perspectives: Race and Ethnicity A less explored 
sociodemographic indicator of cyberaggression concerns race and ethnicity. Hinduja and 
Patchin (2008) found no significant differences among White and non-White individuals 
in rates of both cyberaggression perpetration and cybervictimization. The authors provide 
a novel interpretation for this observed result. Power imbalances between race and ethnic 
groups have historically existed in the United States. The authors argue that the cyber 
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realm does not necessarily allow for conventional power dynamics to hold, where one’s 
race may not hold as much meaning as it may in traditional, face-to-face aggressive 
interactions. Due to equalizing characteristics of the Internet (e.g., potential for 
anonymity), groups who have historically been marginalized who may also become 
targets of cyberaggression may hold the ability to “turn the tables” (Hinduja & Patchin, 
2008; Nimrod, 2013). Other studies have also observed no statistical differences in 
overall reporting of cyberaggressive behaviors between racial and ethnic groups (e.g., 
Bauman, Toomey, & Walker, 2013; Schneider, O'donnell, Stueve, & Coulter, 2012). 
 1.3.5 Sociodemographic Perspectives: Military-Connected Youth The prior 
sociodemographic indicators have provided a general approach to investigating whether 
cyberaggression may operate differently across groups. More focused inquiries into 
specific populations of interest, such as military-connected youth, are limited or 
nonexistent. Previous research has examined how military-connected youths experience 
more negative psychological, emotional, and social outcomes than civilian peers (Astor et 
al., 2013; Gilreath et al., 2013).  Military-connected youth have likewise reported 
increased levels of traditional bullying victimization and perpetration as compared to 
civilian students (Atuel et al., 2014).  Among a sample of 1,957 students in the 7th, 9th, 
and 11th grades who were military-connected (i.e., having a parent or sibling in the 
military), military-connected students endorsed increased levels of feeling harassed 
and/or bullied because of many demographic factors such as their race/ethnicity, gender, 
sexual orientation, religion, or mental or physical disability, as compared to civilian 
peers.  Furthermore, as the total number of familial deployments increased, military-
connected students’ overall reports of discriminatory bullying increased as well (Atuel, 
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2013). Numerous school transitions may expose military-connected youth to 
experiencing peer victimization due to social alienation (i.e., difficulty in establishing and 
maintaining social connections; Atuel et al., 2014; De Pedro, Astor, Gilreath, 
Benbenishty, & Berkowitz, 2016). Evidence from the literature lends support for further 
investigation into aggression and bullying discrepancies between military-connected and 
civilian youth. Therefore, a secondary aim of the present study is to serve as the pioneer 
investigation to explore the frequency of cyberaggression and cybervictimization among 
military-connected youth. 
1.3.6 Measurement Invariance It is apparent that prior research has provided 
initial evidence for why cyberaggression may similarly or differentially operate across 
age, sex, race/ethnicity, and unique populations such as military-connected youth and 
indicated that additional research is needed to better conceptualize and understand these 
distinctions. To extend this line of research and in connection with Benson’s (1998) 
recommendations for building a strong program of measurement, another aspect of strong 
instrumentation, measurement invariance, may serve as a useful next step of inquiry in 
this field. Measurement invariance has even more limited evaluation and evidentiary 
support in both face-to-face aggression and cyberaggression research as compared to 
other aspects of psychometric evaluation (Berne et al., 2013; Card, 2013). Measurement 
invariance assumes that a scale measures the same trait in all demographic or treatment 
groups. If that assumption holds, then comparisons and analyses of those scores yield 
meaningful interpretations; if this assumption is violated, then such analyses do not yield 
meaningful results. A lack of evaluation of measurement invariance in existing 
cyberaggression instrumentation would suggest that researchers cannot make robust 
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comparisons across developmental or sociodemographic indicators, or pre- versus post-
intervention groups (Card, 2013).  
Evaluating measurement invariance entails a multi-sample CFA model with 
structured means. There are several levels of observed measurement invariance for which 
researchers may test. A multi-sample CFA model is constructed by progressively 
introducing equality constraints on parameters; with each additional equality constraint, a 
stronger level of measurement invariance is tested. The first level is termed weak factorial 
invariance. Under this form of invariance, only factor loadings are constrained to be 
equal across groups which examines whether that the same latent variables are being 
measured across groups of interest. The second level is termed strong factorial invariance 
which is tested by applying constraints on both factor loadings and intercepts across 
groups. By constraining both factor loadings and intercepts, one is testing whether the 
measurement of the latent variables is the same across groups, as in weak factorial 
invariance, and additionally testing whether differences in means on the observed 
variables are attributable to differences in means on the latent variables. A third level of 
analysis is termed strict factorial invariance. This form invokes the additional constraint 
that unique variances are invariant across groups which suggests that group differences in 
variances of the observed variables are attributable only to group differences in variances 
of the latent variables, since error variances are forced to be equal across groups. 
As mentioned, few evaluations of measurement invariance on cyberaggression 
instruments currently exist. Landoll et al. (2015) reported strong measurement invariance 
over time (i.e., item loadings and means were similar across two time points) for the C-
PEQ. Other investigations have demonstrated invariance across sex in path models which 
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posited how low self-control predicts cyberbullying perpetration and cybervictimization 
(Vazsonyi, Machackova, Sevcikova, Smahel, & Cerna, 2012) and invariance across 
temporal relationships between cybervictimization and behavioral health sequelae during 
adolescence (i.e., substance use, depression, and problematic internet use; Gámez-
Guadix, Orue, Smith, & Calvete, 2013). No other evaluations of measurement invariance 
across age for current cyberaggression instruments are known. A consideration of how 
cyberaggression may differentially operate between groups is warranted given 
developmental and sociodemographic perspectives on this construct (e.g., Astor et al., 
2013; Dooley, Pyżalski, & Cross, 2009; Lewis, 2015; Schenk, Fremouw, & Keelan, 
2013).  
1.4 PURPOSE OF STUDY  
 In light of public health concerns surrounding cyberaggression as well as its 
distinguishing characteristics from traditional aggression, there is a clear need for further 
inquiry into how cyberaggression operates. Yet as discussed above, with cyberaggression 
being a more recent phenomenon, there is a dearth of consistent and valid instrumentation 
within the field (Berne et al., 2013). Without sound psychometric instrumentation, 
research into cyberaggression is necessarily limited. In particular, investigation into 
distinct and vulnerable populations (e.g., military-connected youth) across various 
developmental and sociodemographic indicators are hindered.  
 Therefore, the primary purpose of this study is to expand on existing 
psychometric evidence for a recently developed measure: the Cyberbullying Experiences 
Survey (CES). Initial evidence for construct validity of the CES has been reported 
(Doane et al., 2013), yet replication in a novel sample is warranted in light of 
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internationally recognized issues of rigor and reproducibility (McNutt, 2014). In addition, 
evidence for measurement invariance of the CES has not been evaluated and is thus 
another research aim for the present investigation. The initial evaluation of the CES 
indicated that men consistently reported more experiences of cyberaggression as 
compared to women. Age was also negatively correlated with three of the 
cybervictimization factors (i.e., public humiliation, malice, and deception) and all four of 
the cyberbullying factors (Doane et al., 2013). This finding indicates that mean levels of 
cyberaggression experiences generally decreased as age increased. Doane et al. (2013) 
suggested that future research should extend investigation of potential differences in 
cyberaggression between age and sex groups. Evaluating evidence of measurement 
invariance therefore serves as a natural next step in the overall evaluation of the CES. 
1.5 RESEARCH AIMS AND HYPOTHESES  
The current investigation considered several tiered research goals:  
1) Conduct a CFA to investigate the structural dimensionality of the CES, 
Hypothesis 1: A four-factor structure underlies item responses on the CES 
cyberaggression and cybervictimization subscales 
2) In the presence of global or local model misspecification, explore alternative 
model solutions utilizing information garnered from analysis in our first research 
goal by incorporating scale revisions as suggested by theoretically relevant 
modification indices and poor functioning items as defined by low variance 
accounted for in their respective constructs 
3) Contingent upon evidence for construct validity derived from the first two 
research aims, extend psychometric investigation of the CES by evaluating 
evidence of measurement invariance across age, 
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Hypothesis 2: The CES will demonstrate, at minimum, weak measurement 
invariance across age 
4) Predicated on finding support for a well-fitting model from our first and second 
research goals, evaluate internal consistency reliability of the instrument 
Hypothesis 3: The cyberaggression and cybervictimization subscales as 
well as the full CES will demonstrate acceptable internal consistency  
5) Given adequate factor structure and internal consistency reliability, we will 
examine convergent validity evidence in a nomological net analysis of the refined 
instrument 
Hypothesis 4: The CES cyberaggression items will show moderate (r = 
.25-.40) to strong (r = .60-.80) correlations and will show convergent 
validity evidence with theoretically related constructs (e.g., cyberbullying, 
peer aggression, mental health difficulties) 
Hypothesis 5: The CES cybervictimization items will show moderate to 
strong correlations and convergent validity evidence with theoretically 
related constructs (e.g., cybervictimization, peer victimization, mental 
health difficulties) 
6) As an exploratory analysis, we will examine the frequency of cyberaggression 
and cybervictimization between male and female participants, white and non-
white participants, as well as among military-connected high school and college 
youth to serve as a pioneer investigation of cyberaggression in this population 
Hypothesis 6: Females, white, and military-connected youth will endorse 
higher frequencies of cyberaggression and cybervictimization
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
2.1 PARTICIPANTS 
 2.1.1 HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS Participants included 225 students from a 
high school located in a southeastern state. The sample was typical of high school 
students in this southeastern state with respect to sex (current sample: 47% male; 
statewide: 51% male) but white participants were overrepresented (current sample: 75% 
white; statewide: 51% white). Exclusion criteria were: 1) non-English speaking and 2) 
responses marked as invalid based on checks for random responding which are later 
described. No participants were removed based on the first exclusion criterion. The 
second exclusion criterion resulted in 25 participants being removed from analysis 
resulting in a final sample of n = 200 high school students (see Table 2.1). Of the 
participants removed who also reported demographic characteristics, there were no 
significant differences across sex (χ2 = 1.65, p > .05), race/ethnicity (χ2 = 2.01, p > .05), 
sexual orientation (χ2 = 3.17, p > .05), or military-connected status (χ2 = 1.13, p > .05). 
2.1.2 COLLEGE STUDENTS Participants included undergraduate students (n = 
495) at the University of South Carolina (USC). The sample was representative of the 
undergraduate population at USC concerning race/ethnicity (current sample: 22% 
minority; USC undergraduate population: 20.6% minority) but females were 
overrepresented (current sample: 82% females; USC undergraduate population: 54% 
females). Exclusion criteria were as follows: 1) participants who were graduate students
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or had another relationship (e.g., faculty, staff, etc.) with USC-Columbia or other USC 
system schools, 2) participants who were below 18 or above 25 years of age, and 3) 
responses marked as invalid based on checks for random responding. These criteria 
excluded 32 participants from analysis resulting in a final sample of n = 463 college 
students (see Table 2.1). Of the participants removed who also reported demographic 
characteristics, there were no significant differences across sex (χ2 = .005, p > .05), 
race/ethnicity (χ2 = 2.36, p > .05), sexual orientation (χ2 = .01, p > .05), or military-
connected status (χ2 = 0.14, p > .05). 
2.2 MEASURES  
Cyberbullying Experiences Survey (CES; Doane, Kelley, Chiang, & Padilla, 
2013) The CES is a 41-item measure which includes two subscales of cyberbullying 
perpetration (20 items) and cybervictimization (21 items). The additional item on the 
cybervictimization subscale contains content specific to cybervictimization (i.e., “Have 
you completed an electronic survey that was supposed to remain private but the answers 
were sent to someone else?”) and does not have a mirrored item on the cyberbullying 
subscale. Self-reported responses were recorded on a 6-point Likert scale (0 = Never to 5 
= Almost every day). Thus, scores could range from 0-100 on the cyberbullying 
perpetration subscale and from 0-105 on the cybervictimization subscale. Psychometric 
studies conducted on the CES have demonstrated a four-factor structure in both the 
cyberbullying perpetration and cybervictimization subscales, as well as evidence for 
internal consistency reliability across factors (α = .62-.87) and convergent validity 
(Doane et al., 2013).  
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Table 2.1 
Final High School (n =200) / College (n = 463) Student Sample Demographics 
Characteristic Overall 
 
Mean age (SD) 
 
Age Frequencies (n)      
 
     14 
 
     15 
 
     16 
 
     17 
 
     18 (high school /college) 
 
     19 
      
     20  
 
     21  
 
     22+  
 
Gender  
 
     Female (n, %) 
 
     Male (n, %) 
 
Race (n, %) 
 
     White 
 
     African-American/Black 
 
     Hispanic/Latino 
 
     Asian/Other 
 
Sexual Orientation (% Heterosexual) 
 
Military-Connected Youth (n, %) 
 
15.83 (1.23) / 19.94 (1.53) 
 
 
 
34 
 
52 
 
36 
 
66 
 
11 / 83 
 
119 
 
119 
 
74 
 
60 
 
 
 
103 (52%) / 379 (82%) 
 
94 (47%) / 80 (17%) 
 
 
 
149 (75%) / 360 (78%) 
 
24 (12%) / 54 (12%) 
 
5 (3%) / 17 (4%) 
 
22 (11%) / 32 (7%) 
 
92% / 91% 
 
16 (8%) / 51 (11%) 
 30 
 
Revised Cyberbullying Inventory (RCBI; Topcu & Erdur-Baker, 2010) The 
RCBI is a 28-item self-report measure which measures cyberbullying and 
cybervictimization. The cyberbully and cybervictim subscales each include 14 items and 
ask respondents to answer whether they have performed or received various aspects of 
cyberbullying during the previous twelve months. Items are scored on a 4-point Likert 
scale (0 = Never to 3 = More than three times) and summed scores can range from 0-42 
with higher scores indicating more frequent cyberbullying or cybervictimization. 
Previous studies on the RCBI have demonstrated acceptable to strong internal 
consistency reliabilities across the two subscales (α = .79-.92; Brack & Caltabiano, 2015; 
Topcu & Erdur-Baker, 2010) and evidence for construct validity in adolescent and young 
adult populations. We observed acceptable to excellent internal consistency reliabilities 
in the present study (see Table 2.2). 
Self-Report of Aggression and Social Behavior Measure (SRASBM; Morales 
& Crick, 1998). The SRASBM is a 56-item instrument which includes 11 subscales that 
measure forms of relational aggression/victimization, physical aggression/victimization, 
exclusivity, and prosocial behavior. We utilized the relational aggression/victimization 
subscales to inform our investigation of convergent validity evidence for the CES in our 
college student sample. Respondents rate items based on experiences within the previous 
year on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all true to 7 = Very true). These scales have 
demonstrated poor to acceptable internal consistencies in adult samples (α = .66-.83) and 
construct validity has been established for the SRASBM in comparison with other 
theoretically related constructs (Murray-Close, Ostrov, Nelson, Crick, & Coccaro, 2010). 
We observed poor to good internal consistency reliabilities in this study (see Table 2.2). 
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Peer Conflict Scale (PCS; Marsee et al., 2004) The Peer Conflict Scale is a 40-
item instrument that measures dimensions of peer aggression (i.e., reactive overt, reactive 
relational, proactive overt, and proactive relational) in youth. We utilized the PCS in our 
evaluation of convergent validity evidence for the CES among our high school student 
sample. Items are scored on a 4-point Likert scale (0 = Not at all true to 3 = Definitely 
true). Possible scores could range from 0-120. The PCS has demonstrated acceptable to 
good internal consistency reliabilities across all four subscales (α = .79-.83) and evidence 
for both construct validity and measurement invariance (Marsee et al., 2011). The PCS 
demonstrated good to excellent internal consistency reliabilities in the present study (see 
Table 2.2.). 
Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 1997) The 
Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire is a 25-item scale that measures aspects of 
internalizing, externalizing, and pro-social behavior across five subscales. All items are 
on a 3-point Likert scale (1 = Not true to 3 = Certainly true). Two versions of the scale 
were used to accommodate the age range of participants: an adolescent (11-17) version 
and a version adapted for individuals over 18 years of age. The adolescent and adult 
versions do not differ in item content; they differ in use of age-appropriate pronouns. For 
example, an item on the adolescent version states “I often offer to help others (parents, 
teachers, children)” and the adult version states “I often offer to help others (family 
members, friends, colleagues).” Prior research has indicated satisfactory internal 
consistency reliability for the SDQ adolescent version (α = .73; Goodman, 2001). No 
psychometric evaluations for the SDQ 18+ version have been conducted.  We observed 
poor to acceptable internal consistency reliabilities (see Table 2.2). 
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Table 2.2 
Internal Consistency Reliability Estimates for Nomological Net Instruments 
Measure Combined College High School  
 
RCBI 
     Cyberbullying 
     Cybervictimization 
 
.89 
.85 
.79 
 
.85 
.80 
.77 
 
.94 
.88 
.91 
SRASBM 
     Reactive Relational  Aggression 
     Proactive Relational Aggression 
     Cross-Gender Relational Aggression 
     Relational Victimization 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.93 
.70 
.79 
.73 
.84 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
PCS 
     Reactive Overt 
     Reactive Relational 
     Proactive Overt 
     Proactive Relational 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.94 
.82 
.83 
.85 
.85 
SDQ 
     Total Difficulties 
     Prosocial 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.72 
.74 
.68* 
 
.77 
.67* 
.70 
 
Note: RCBI = Revised Cyberbullying Inventory; Self-Report of Aggression and Social 
Behavior Measure; PCS = Peer Conflict Scale; SDQ = Strengths and Difficulties 
Questionnaire. Acceptable, good, and excellent internal consistencies estimates: 0.7 ≤ α < 
0.8, 0.8 ≤ α < 0.9, and α ≥ 0.9, respectively.  
*All subscales with estimates below 0.7 will not be interpreted for the nomological net 
analyses. 
 
Military-Connected Youth To identify military-connected participants, several 
items were included which mirrored content from the California Healthy Kids Survey – 
Military Module (Gilreath, Estrada, Pineda, Benbenishty, & Astor, 2014). These include:  
1) Do you have someone in your immediate family (e.g., father, mother, brother, 
sister) who is currently in the military (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, 
National Guard, or Reserves)?  
2) Who in your family is currently in the military (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, 
Air Force, National Guard, or Reserves)?  
 33 
 
3) In what branch (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force) of the military is your 
family  member(s) serving or have served?  
4) As far as you can remember, how many times in the last 10 years did any 
member of your family leave home or serve (deploy) outside of the USA?  
5) In the last five years, how many times did you change your school because 
your family had to move? 
2.3 PROCEDURE 
2.3.1 HIGH SCHOOL RECRUITMENT The primary investigator submitted 
research proposals to four public school districts and one private high school located in 
the southeastern United States. Permission to recruit participants was only granted at the 
private high school. All public-school districts cited the following reasons for denying 
access to students: 1) impediment on instructional time, 2) survey was not aligned with 
state-mandated school curricula, or 3) survey included sensitive information (e.g., gender, 
sexual orientation, and cyberaggression). Data collection procedures at the participating 
school involved students completing the online survey during their homeroom periods. 
Parental opt-out forms were sent via the high school’s email listserv to all parents of the 
students. No opt-out forms were returned. 
2.3.2 COLLEGE RECRUITMENT Data were collected from participants in the 
Psychology Subject Pool at USC as well as from several other academic departments. 
The primary investigator contacted professors and student organizations to gain access to 
potential participants across campus. Specific recruitment strategies included: 
1) Posting survey link on the Psychology Subject Pool website 
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2) Advertising the survey in undergraduate courses (the survey link and primary 
investigator contact information were provided to students during this time) 
3) Posting recruitment fliers around the USC – Columbia campus 
Participants took the survey at a preferred location and time on their own 
personal computers. Participants were given the opportunity to potentially 
gain extra course credit (as allowed by their instructor) and be entered in a 
drawing to win one of three available $50 Best Buy gift cards. 
 2.3.3 SURVEY ADMINISTRATION The survey was administered online using 
Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). As the CES was the primary instrument of focus, it was 
administered first. The remaining measures were randomized in order to account for 
potential effects of participant fatigue and order effects across conditions. The final 
battery included 140 items for college student participants and 143 items for high school 
participants and took on average 20-40 minutes to complete. All procedures were 
approved by the University of South Carolina Institutional Review Board. 
2.2.4 DATA ANALYSIS In line with strategies for monitoring random 
responding on online surveys (Meade & Craig, 2012), we employed several controls in 
the present study. First, participants who completed the survey in 5 minutes or less were 
excluded from data analysis to increase our confidence in the validity of responses. As 
there were 140-143 total questions in the entire battery, completed responses in 5 minutes 
or less were determined to be an unreasonable response time. An additional check to 
control for random responding included a self-reported single item indicator which states 
“I put forth my best effort in responding to this survey” which was scored on a 5-point 
Likert Scale (0 = Strongly Disagree to 4 = Strongly Agree; Meade & Craig, 2012). These 
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two strategies are recommended as a minimum for monitoring random responding. Given 
the complex nature of the proposed analyses, we also incorporated a more robust strategy 
which involved including three instructed items (e.g., “To monitor quality, please 
respond with a two for this item”). Meade and Craig (2012) recommend the use of 
instructed items as they are designed to indicate whether participants make an effort to 
read item stems. Questionnaires were deemed invalid based on these controls if 
participants did not respond with at least 75% (3 out of 4) correct responses. As 
previously mentioned, a total of 25 high school participant responses and 32 college 
participant responses were removed from analyses based on these controls. 
2.2.4.1 STRUCTURAL ANALYSES OF THE CES: CONFIRMATORY 
FACTOR ANALYSES CFA analyses were conducted utilizing Mplus Version 7.2 
(Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2012). Full information maximum-likelihood (FIML) was 
utilized to estimate parameter estimates in the model, as this method has been shown to 
generate the most asymptotically unbiased (i.e., neither overestimates or underestimates 
model parameters), asymptotically efficient (i.e., the variability of the parameter 
estimates are minimized), and consistent parameter estimates (i.e., model parameters are 
the most accurate representation of population parameters, as sample increases) in a 
variety of circumstances (West, Finch, & Curran, 1995). A confirmatory factor model 
using the oblique Geomin rotation was analyzed to test the posited four-factor structure 
underlying the CES cyberaggression and cybervictimization items, permitting the factors 
to correlate as theoretically supported (Berne et al., 2013; Doane et al., 2013). 
Unstandardized and standardized estimates as well as variances accounted for by the 
latent factors in each item were reported. Both absolute and incremental fit indices were 
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utilized to assess adequacy of model fit. A chi-square (χ2) goodness-of-fit test was used to 
assess absolute model fit, with lower, non-significant χ2 values indicating acceptable 
model fit for the two-factor model. Incremental model fit gauges the extent of misfit 
instead of using an all-or-nothing approach.  
 Though useful to understand, limiting analysis of global model fit to an all-or-
nothing approach provides no information on the extent of model misfit if found. 
Moreover, the χ2 statistic is known to be sensitive to sample size (i.e., underestimates 
goodness-of-fit for N > 500 sample sizes and overestimates goodness-of-fit for N < 100; 
Hu, Bentler, & Hoyle, 1995). Supplementing the analysis of absolute fit via the 
evaluation of additional incremental fit indices provides a solution to both of these 
problems. Based on Hu and Bentler’s (1998; 1999) recommendations, the comparative fit 
index (CFI), standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), and root mean square error 
of approximation (RMSEA) were used to further assess the degree of model 
misspecification (both simple and complex) to supplement the χ2 statistic.  
The CFI is measured on a 0 – 1 scale, with higher scores indicating better model 
fit. CFI values close to .90 (Bollen, 1989) or .95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999) are indicative of 
good model fit. The CFI has found to be sensitive to complex misspecification, and 
robust to both distributional non-normality and sample size (Hu & Bentler, 1998). The 
SRMR is similar to the CFI in that it penalizes models with a higher number of 
parameters resulting in a decrease in model fit (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). The 
measure provides the standardized difference between observed correlations and 
predicted correlations by computing the average residual covariance, or the differences 
between the observed and model-implied covariances (Kline, 1998). Unlike the CFI and 
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RMSEA, the SRMR is more sensitive to simple model misspecification. Lower SRMR 
values are associated with better model fit, with zero indicating perfect fit of a model to 
the observed data. As the average discrepancy between the observed and model-implied 
covariances increases, so does the value of the SRMR. Yu (2002) and Hu and Bentler 
(1999) have suggested cut-off values of .07 and .08 or lower respectively to be 
considered as good model fit. Finally, the RMSEA fit statistic is a parsimony-adjusted, 
residual-based, fit statistic that includes a built-in correction for model complexity. The 
RMSEA is more sensitive to underparameterized models and relatively unaffected by 
model overparameterization (Marsh & Balla, 1994), suggesting that it prefers 
parsimonious models but does not necessarily penalize more complex models (Hooper, 
Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). Yu (2002) and Hu and Bentler (1999) have recommended 
RMSEA cut-off values of .05 and .06 and below respectively, with lower RMSEA values 
indicating better model fit (and less discrepancy between observed and predicted model 
covariances). The RMSEA has been shown to be robust to sample size and non-normal 
distributions. 
Along with global measures of misfit, we also explored local sources of misfit in 
the presence of model misspecification via standardized estimates and modification 
indices. Standardized estimates were investigated to examine variance explained in each 
item by the construct via squaring the loading (R2 estimate). Modification indices were 
assessed to investigate specific, problematic parameters. A modification index estimates 
the amount by which the model’s overall χ2 statistic would decrease if a particular 
parameter were freely estimated (Kline, 1998).  
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2.2.4.2 MEASUREMENT INVARIANCE OF THE CES To address the 
research question of whether the CES measures the same trait across age, we constructed 
a multi-sample CFA model with structured means. To test measurement invariance, a 
sequence of models, beginning with an unconstrained model and progressively 
introducing equality constraints on parameters based on a priori hypotheses, were 
evaluated. That is, a null hypothesis test of equality of the population covariance matrices 
(i.e., factor loadings, unique variances, and factor variances and covariances) was first 
carried out. If this model is not rejected, it is plausible to conclude evidence for 
measurement invariance across these model parameters. If this null model is rejected, we 
will examine a series of models to determine what model parameters may be invariant. 
Recent investigations have recommended using ΔCFI, ΔRMSEA, and ΔSRMR as indices 
to evaluate evidence for measurement invariance. For testing weak invariance, observing 
ΔCFI ≥ −.010, ΔRMSEA ≥ .015, or ΔSRMR ≥ .030 would indicate noninvariance. For 
testing strong and strict invariance models, observing ΔCFI ≥ −.010, ΔRMSEA ≥ .015, or 
ΔSRMR ≥ .010 would indicate noninvariance (Chen, 2007). 
 2.2.4.3 STRUCTURAL ANALYSES OF THE CES: INTERNAL 
CONSISTENCY For the research question regarding internal consistency reliability of 
the CES’s items, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (α) was evaluated to assess inter-item 
reliability of the instrument. Judgments of appropriate reliability estimates were based off 
of recommendations for acceptable, good, and excellent internal consistencies estimates: 
0.7 ≤ α < 0.8, 0.8 ≤ α < 0.9, and α ≥ 0.9, respectively (George & Mallery, 2003).  
2.2.4.4 EXTERNAL ANALYSES OF THE CES: ESTABLISHING A 
NOMOLOGICAL NET To establish the nomological net for the CES, analyses 
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exploring convergent validity were employed. This procedure involved correlating items 
from the CES and items from theoretically related instruments. We analyzed correlations 
among items derived from peer aggression, cyberaggression, and mental health 
difficulties scales with the CES’s cyberaggression items to assess convergent validity. 
Scales measuring peer victimization, cybervictimization, and mental health difficulties 
were also examined for correlations with the C-PEQ’s cybervictimization items to assess 
convergent validity.   
2.2.4.5 POWER ANALYSES To determine an appropriate sample size to have 
sufficient power for meeting the recommended cut-off point criteria for the RMSEA fit 
index, an a priori power analysis was performed. Even though this is not a holistic 
approach in determining power for all of the recommended CFA fit indices (i.e., CFI, 
SRMR, and RMSEA; Hu & Bentler, 1999), the RMSEA is one of the most commonly-
used fit indices (Kenny, Kaniskan, & McCoach, 2015), and generally provides a good 
basis for information regarding power for the CFA analyses. Further, previous 
researchers have developed sample size planning methods for CFA analyses based on this 
index to understand the power of analysis to reject poorly fitting models and to identify 
good fitting models (defined by H0 = .08 and H1 = .05, respectively in the test; Browne & 
Cudeck, 1993; MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996; Steiger, 1990). Maxwell, 
Kelley, and Rausch (2008) state that the idea is not necessarily to test an exact model, but 
to determine a sample size so that not-good-fitting models can be rejected. Using the 
conventional field standards of power = 1 – β = .8 and α = .05 (e.g., Cohen, 1988), a 
priori power analyses based on the model indicated a required sample size of n = 97. To 
answer our research questions involving measurement invariance analysis, prior 
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simulation research has indicated that samples as small as n = 50 or n = 100 will allow 
researchers to detect large model violations whereas a sample size of at least n = 200 is 
required to detect small model violations (Koller, Maier, & Hatzinger, 2015). Given our 
sample sizes of 200 high school and 463 college students, this study was adequately 
powered for addressing all research questions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
3.1 MISSING DATA 
 Missing data for the CES was minimal (<1%). Nevertheless, full information 
maximum-likelihood (FIML) was utilized to estimate model parameters. FIML estimates 
a likelihood function for each individual case based on the observed data so that all 
available information is utilized; variables with no information were not estimated 
(Newsom, 2015).  
3.2 CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR CES   
 3.2.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS Inter-item correlations for the CES are 
reported in Appendix A. Means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis for the CES 
items are presented in Appendix B. All CES items are referenced in Appendix C. We 
conducted both square root and logarithmic transformations in an attempt to satisfy 
normality assumptions (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Neither data transformation resulted 
in improvements in normality as a result of substantial floor effects. We therefore decided 
to employ the original, non-transformed data to preserve interpretability of results and 
invoked mean-adjusted maximum-likelihood estimation to account for violations of 
normality. This estimation strategy produces an adjusted absolute fit index termed the 
Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square statistic that is robust to the violations of the normality 
assumption (Satorra & Bentler, 2001).
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 3.2.2 MODEL RESULTS CFA results for the hypothesized four-factor 
cyberaggression model solution as suggested by Doane et al. (2013) indicated model 
misfit: χ2 (164) = 349.72, p < .001. Both the RMSEA (.04) and SRMR (.07) fell below 
recommended cut-off values; the CFI did not approach recommended cut-off values 
(.89). We assessed the variance accounted for in the items by their respective latent 
factors to identify weak items. This investigation suggested that items 10, 11, 14, 16, and 
17 had 85 – 97% observed variance not accounted for by their respective latent factors. 
 CFA results for the hypothesized four-factor cybervictimization model solution 
indicated model misfit: χ2 (183) = 562.55, p < .001). Both the RMSEA (.06) and SRMR 
(.06) fell below recommended cut-off values; the CFI did not approach recommended 
cut-off values (.89). We again assessed the variance accounted for in the items by their 
respective latent factors. This investigation noted that cybervictimization items 1, 4, 5, 6, 
and 8 had 75 – 94% observed variance not accounted for by their latent factor. 
 3.2.3 MODEL REFINEMENT Given model misspecification, we explored 
modification indices. These suggested adding correlated error terms between items 12/13 
on the cyberaggression scale, as well as items 10/11 and 13/14 on the cybervictimization 
scale. The addition of these correlated error terms made theoretical sense as these item 
pairs shared similar item stems and content. We subsequently investigated a modified 
four-factor solution for the CES items with invoked modifications indices. Though the 
cyberaggression model Satorra-Bentler χ2 was significant, χ2 (163) = 327.75, p < .001, 
results indicated that all incremental fit indices met or approached recommended cut-off 
values (SRMR = .06, RMSEA = .04, CFI = .90). Likewise, though the cybervictimization 
model Satorra-Bentler χ2 was significant, χ2 (181) = 422.33, p < .001, results indicated 
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that all incremental fit indices met or approached recommended cut-off values (SRMR = 
.06, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .93).  These results support the revised models. We utilized 
these modified solutions to inform our remaining research aims. 
3.3 SINGLE-GROUP CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSES BY AGE 
 3.3.1 CYBERAGGRESSION MODEL RESULTS All model results are 
reported in Table 3.1. The first step in evaluating measurement invariance is to 
investigate configural invariance through conducting single-group CFAs for the 
hypothesized four-factor cyberaggression model across both college and high school 
samples. The model Satorra-Bentler chi-square statistics were significant for both college 
(χ2 (163) = 246.46, p < .001) and high school (χ2 (163) = 226.11, p < .001) samples, 
although all incremental fit indices met or approached acceptable cut-off 
recommendations in both samples (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Results also indicated that the 
“unwanted contact” and “deception” cyberaggression subscales correlated at r = .99 in 
the high school model. Researchers suggest that subscales correlating r ≥ .85 may result 
in multicollinearity due to poor discriminative validity (Kenny, 2012). Configural 
invariance for cyberaggression was therefore not supported between college and high 
school participants as a result of the hypothesized model differing for high school 
students. We subsequently employed an exploratory approach to determine a factor 
solution which provided acceptable fit across both college and high school samples. 
 3.3.2 MODEL REFINEMENT We used the following analytic method to 
investigate a revised model solution for the CES cyberaggression model: 
 Step 1: Conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) for the high school 
 sample to uncover the underlying structure of the CES cyberaggression items. 
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Table 3.1 
Goodness-of-Fit Indicators of Models for CES Cyberaggression Items 
 
Model 
 
 
MLM χ2 
 
df 
 
RMSEA 
 
CFI 
 
SRMR 
Hypothesized Model Solutions 
Single-Group College 4-Factor 
 
246.46* 
 
162 
 
.03 
 
.94 
 
.05 
Single-Group High School 4-factor# 
 
226.11* 162 .05 .91 .08 
Final Model Solutions##      
     CFA 3-Factor Solution College 273.01* 163 .04 .92 .06 
     CFA 3-Factor Solution High  
     School 
 
196.29* 165 .03 .96 .08 
 
*p < .001 
#“Unwanted contact” and “deception” subscales correlated at r = .99. 
##“Sexual cyberaggression,” “direct cyberaggression,” and “coercion” subscales. 
 
Step 2: Integrated EFA results with theoretical considerations and item 
intercorrelations to conduct an EFA with target rotation for the high school 
sample. The Target EFA places additional restrictions on model parameters 
 compared to a  traditional EFA where items are partially specified to serve as 
 indicators for the proposed latent variable structure. 
 Step 3: Performed a CFA for both college and high school samples with the 
 revised model solution as informed by the previous two steps. A CFA is more 
 restrictive compared to the Target EFA where items are now fully specified to 
 serve as indicators for the proposed latent variable structure. 
Rationale for and results from Steps 1 and 2 are explained in Appendix D and only results 
from the final model solutions are reported in this section. 
 Final Model Results: Given evidentiary support from our EFA and Target EFA 
solutions, we subsequently performed a revised three-factor CFA solution for both the 
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high school and college samples for the proposed latent variable structure (i.e., “sexual 
cyberaggression,” “direct cyberaggression,” and “coercion”). Although the Satorra-
Bentler chi-square did not indicate acceptable model fit for either the high school (χ2 
(165) = 196.29, p < .001) or college sample (χ2 (163) = 273.01, p < .001), incremental fit 
indices met or approached recommended cut-off values in both samples (High School: 
RMSEA = .03, CFI = .96, SRMR = .08; College: RMSEA = .04, CFI = .92, SRMR = 
.06). As shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, factors correlated from r = .23-.56 which is 
consistent with psychometric research in this field (Berne et al., 2013) and several item 
error variances were correlated in the college and high school models. These correlations 
were added to the model based on theoretical considerations and similar item stems to 
reflect variance shared between those items that are unrelated to the latent variable for 
which they serve as indicators. Overall, these results support the revised three-factor 
model solution for the CES cyberaggression items in both samples. We subsequently 
utilized this modified solution to inform our third and fourth research aims. Appendix C 
includes the CES item configurations for the final revised cyberaggression solutions 
across college and high school samples. Table 3.2 presents standardized factor loadings 
and variance explained in each item by the latent variables. 
3.3.3 CYBERVICTIMIZATION MODEL RESULTS A similar analytical 
approach was used for determining an acceptable model solution for the 
cybervictimization items. All model results are reported in Table 3.3. Single-group CFAs 
for the hypothesized four-factor cybervictimization models for college and high school 
samples were performed first. The Satorra-Bentler chi-squares were significant for both 
college (χ2 (181) = 329.84, p < .001) and high school (χ2 (181) = 351.97, p < .001) 
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Figure 3.1. Results from the revised CES cyberaggression three-factor solution for 
college students. Standardized factor loadings, error terms, and correlated factor/error 
terms are presented.  
 
models. Incremental fit indices met acceptable cut-off recommendations (Hu & Bentler, 
1999) in the college sample (RMSEA = .04, CFI = .95, SRMR = .05), but not in the high 
school sample (RMSEA = .07, CFI = .85, SRMR = .08), indicating the presence of model 
misspecification. Configural invariance was therefore not supported between college and 
high school participants as a result of the hypothesized model differing for high school 
students. We subsequently employed a similar exploratory approach to determine a factor 
solution for the cybervictimization items which provided acceptable fit across both 
college and high school samples. 
3.3.4 MODEL REFINEMENT The method used to determine a revised model 
solution for the cybervictimization items was identical to the method employed for the 
cyberaggression model revisions. All analytical steps and preliminary model results  
Coercion 
A6 A8 A15 
.09 .06 .07 
.49 .27 .57 
Direct 
Cyberaggression 
A16 A17 A9 
.08 .07 .03 
.46 .72 .72 
A10 A11 A12 
.04 .02 .01 
.66 .91 .91 
A13 A14 A18 
.03 .03 .06 
.81 .70 .39 
A19 A20 
.06 .06 
.33 .39 
A5 
.08 
.17 
.49 
.56 
Sexual 
Cyberaggression 
A2 A3 A4 
.07 .10 .09 
.60 .39 .36 
A7 
.42 
A1 
.09 
.26 
.10 
.51 
.32 
.35 
.26 
.23 
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Figure 3.2. Results from the revised CES cyberaggression three-factor solution for high 
school students. Standardized factor loadings, error terms, and correlated factor/error 
terms are presented.  
 
garnered from those procedures are also described in Appendix D. Results from the final 
model solutions are reported in this section. 
 Final Model Results: We performed a three-factor CFA solution for both high 
school and college samples for the revised latent factor structure (i.e., “sexual 
cybervictimization,” “direct cybervictimization,” and “defamation” subscales). Although 
the Satorra-Bentler chi-square did not indicate acceptable model fit for either the high 
school (χ2 (160) = 256.32, p < .001) or college sample (χ2 (163) = 367.81, p < .001), 
incremental fit indices met or approached recommended cut-off values in both samples  
(High School: RMSEA = .06, CFI = .92, SRMR = .07; College: RMSEA = .05, CFI = 
.93, SRMR = .06). As shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, factors correlated from r = .46-.78 
and several item error variances were correlated in the college and high school models. 
Indirect 
A6 A8 A15 
.08 .15 .06 
.34 .56 .86 
Direct 
A16 A17 A9 
.11 .08 .06 
.83 .68 .73 
A10 A11 A12 
.06 .03 .02 
.74 .86 .92 
A13 A14 A18 
.02 .04 .09 
.91 .74 .51 
A19 A20 
.11 .08 
.37 .47 
A5 
.17 
.72 
.29 
Sex 
A2 A3 A4 
.19 .12 .18 
.74 .56 .23 
A7 
.31 
A1 
.13 
.23 
.19 
.23 
.95 .40 
.27 
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Table 3.2 
Standardized Loadings and Item Variance for the 3-Factor Confirmatory Model of 
Cyberaggression 
 
Ite
m  
Sexual 
Cyberaggression 
Coercion Direct 
Cyberaggression 
Item R2 Values 
 High 
School 
College High 
School 
College High 
School 
College High 
School 
College 
 
#1 
 
.23 
 
.26  
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
.05 
 
.07 
#2 .74 .60 -- -- -- -- .55 .37 
#3 .56 .39 -- -- -- -- .31 .16 
#4 .23 .36 -- -- -- -- .05 .13 
#5 .31 .42 -- -- -- -- .09 .17 
#6 -- -- .72 .16 -- -- .52 .03 
#7 -- -- .34 .49 -- -- .11 .24 
#8 -- -- .56 .27 -- -- .32 .07 
#9 -- -- .86 .57 -- -- .73 .32 
#10 -- -- .83 .46 -- -- .69 .21 
#11 -- -- .68 .72 -- -- .46 .52 
#12 -- -- -- -- .73 .72 .53 .52 
#13 -- -- -- -- .74 .66 .54 .44 
#14 -- -- -- -- .86 .91 .74 .83 
#15 -- -- -- -- .92 .91 .84 .84 
#16 -- -- -- -- .91 .81 .82 .65 
#17 -- -- -- -- .74 .70 .55 .50 
#18 -- -- -- -- .51 .39 .26 .15 
#19 -- -- -- -- .37 .33 .14 .11 
#20 -- -- -- -- .47 .39 .22 .15 
         
 
Note. R2 represents the variance accounted for in an item by the latent factor for which it 
serves as an indicator. 
 
These correlations were added to the model based on theoretical considerations and 
similar item stems to reflect variance shared between those items that is unrelated to the  
latent variable for which they serve as indicators. Overall, these results support the 
revised three-factor model solution for the CES cybervictimization items in both samples. 
We utilized this modified solution to inform our third and fourth research aims. Appendix 
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Table 3.3 
Goodness-of-Fit Indicators of Models for CES Cybervictimization Items 
 
Model 
 
 
MLM χ2 
 
df 
 
RMSEA 
 
CFI 
 
SRMR 
Hypothesized Model Solutions 
Single-Group College 4-Factor 
 
329.84* 
 
181 
 
.04 
 
.95 
 
.05 
Single-Group High School 4-factor 
 
351.97* 181 .07 .85 .08 
Final Model Solutions#      
     CFA 3-Factor Solution College 367.81* 163 .05 .93 .06 
     CFA 3-Factor Solution High  
     School 
 
256.32* 160 .06 .92 .07 
 
*p < .001 
#“Sexual cybervictimization,” “direct cybervictimization,” and “defamation” subscales. 
 
C includes the CES cybervictimization item configurations across college and high 
school samples. Table 3.4 presents standardized factor loadings and variance explained in 
each item by the latent variables.   
3.4 INTERNAL CONSISTENCY OF THE CES 
 Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present inter-correlations of the latent factors, means, standard 
deviations, and reliability estimates. Cronbach’s coefficient alpha estimates of internal 
consistency for the CES cyberaggression items was good in both high school (α = .88) 
and college (α = .83) samples. Internal consistency for the CES cybervictimization items 
was excellent in the high school sample (α = .90) and good in the college sample (α = 
.89). Internal consistencies among the cyberaggression subscales, however, ranged from 
poor to good across both samples (α = .54 – .88) and ranged from acceptable to excellent 
among the cybervictimization subscales across both samples (α = .76 – .92). These 
findings reflect observed results in the original investigation (Doane et al., 2013).  
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Figure 3.3. Results from the revised CES cybervictimization three-factor solution for 
college students. Standardized factor loadings, error terms, and correlated factor/error 
terms are presented.  
3.5 NOMOLOGICAL NET: CONVERGENT VALIDITY EVIDENCE 
 3.5.1 CES CYBERAGGRESSION SUBSCALE As reliability is a necessary but 
not sufficient component of evaluating construct validity (Nunnally, 1978), subscales 
indicating unacceptable reliability (i.e., α ≥ .70) were not considered for our nomological 
net analyses. Thus, the sexual cyberaggression and coercion subscales in the college 
sample and the sexual cyberaggression subscale in the high school sample were not 
considered. All reported results are summarized in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. 
There were mixed results regarding our hypotheses. As predicted, a moderate 
correlation was observed between the direct cyberaggression subscale and the RCBI 
cyberbullying subscale in both samples. Mostly moderate correlations were also observed 
 
Direct 
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Indirect/ 
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.03 .06 
.76 .60 
V3 V4 V5 
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.62 .43 .45 
V6 V8 V9 
.17 .05 .05 
.48 .47 .44 
V19 V20 
.06 .04 
.53 .67 
V10 
.03 
.79 
.71 
Sex 
V16 V17 V18 
.01 .03 .03 
.93 .84 .79 
V15 
.01 
.46 
.33 
.60 
V21
.05 
.48 
V1 
.05 
.43 
.26 .53 .56 
.91 
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Figure 3.4. Results from the revised CES cybervictimization three-factor solution for 
high school students. Standardized factor loadings, error terms, and correlated 
factor/error terms are presented.  
 
between the cyberaggression subscales and measures of peer aggression on the SRASBM 
and PCS. There was a weak correlation observed between direct cyberaggression and 
proactive overt aggression subscale on the PCS, however. Weak to moderate correlations 
were observed between the cyberaggression subscales and the SDQ mental health 
difficulties subscale in the college sample and the SDQ prosocial behaviors subscale in 
the high school sample. 
3.5.2 CES CYBERVICTIMIZATION SUBSCALE As predicted, moderate 
correlations were observed between the CES cybervictimization subscales and the RCBI 
cybervictimization subscale in both samples (rs = .30 – .59). Also, as predicted, moderate 
correlations were observed between the CES cybervictimization subscales and measures  
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Table 3.4 
Standardized Loadings and Item Variance for the 3-Factor Confirmatory Model of 
Cybervictimization 
 
Ite
m  
Sexual 
Cybervictimization 
Defamation Direct 
Cybervictimization 
Item R2 Values 
 High 
School 
College High 
School 
College High 
School 
College High 
School 
College 
 
#1 
 
.72 
 
 .91 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
.52 
 
.84 
#2 .84 .93 -- -- -- -- .70 .86 
#3 .91 .84 -- -- -- -- .82 .70 
#4 .74 .79 -- -- -- -- .54 .62 
#5 -- -- .40 .43 -- -- .16 .19 
#6 -- -- .44 .60 -- -- .20 .36 
#7 -- -- .78 .62 -- -- .61 .39 
#8 -- -- .13 .43 -- -- .02 .18 
#9 -- -- .34 .45 -- -- .11 .21 
#10 -- -- .36 .48 -- -- .13 .23 
#11 -- -- .35 .47 -- -- .12 .22 
#12 -- -- .60 .44 -- -- .36 .20 
#13 -- -- .72 .53 -- -- .51 .28 
#14 -- -- .65 .67 -- -- .43 .45 
#15 -- -- .32 .48 -- -- .10 .23 
#16 -- -- -- -- .88 .79 .77 .62 
#17 -- -- -- -- .90 .85 .81 .72 
#18 -- -- -- -- .72 .80 .52 .64 
#19 -- -- -- -- .84 .82 .70 .68 
#20 -- -- -- -- .72 .76 .52 .58 
         
 
Note. R2 represents the variance accounted for in an item by the latent factor for which it 
serves as an indicator. 
 
of relational victimization (rs = .27 – .35) and mental health difficulties (rs = .25 – .28) in 
the college student sample. The CES cybervictimization subscales weakly correlated with 
a measure of prosocial behavior (rs = -.02 – -.17) in the high school sample. These results 
are also summarized in Tables 3.7 and 3.8.  Overall, investigation into the nomological 
net provided mixed evidence of construct validity for the revised CES scores as most but 
not all hypotheses were supported.  
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Table 3.5 
Correlations, Reliability, and Descriptive Statistics of the CES Subscales (College) 
 
 
 
Cyberaggression 
Subscales 
Cybervictimization Subscales 
Cyberaggression 
     Sex 
     Coercion 
     Direct 
Cybervictimization 
     Sex 
     Defamation 
     Direct 
 
Cronbach’s  
Coefficient α 
 
Factor Meana, b 
 
Sex 
1.00 
.51** 
.23* 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
 
.54 
 
.32 
Coercion 
-- 
1.00 
.56** 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
 
.61 
 
.81 
 
Direct 
-- 
-- 
1.00 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
 
.88 
 
6.33 
Sex 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
1.00 
.60** 
.46** 
 
 
.92 
 
3.05 
Defamation 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
-- 
1.00 
.71** 
 
 
.76 
 
3.66 
Direct 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
-- 
-- 
1.00 
 
 
.91 
 
5.53 
 
 
Note. n = 463. a = possible range of scores for cyberaggression: Sex = 0 – 25; Coercion = 
0 – 30; Direct = 0 – 45. b = possible range of scores for cybervictimization: Sex = 0 – 20; 
Defamation = 0 – 55; Direct = 0 – 25.  
*p < .05; **p < .001. 
 
3.6 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ACROSS DEMOGRAPHICS 
 Factor mean scores for all revised CES subscales across demographics are 
reported in Table 3.9. In college, mean scores indicated that males endorsed higher 
frequencies of perpetrating cyberaggression as compared to females across all subscales; 
females reported higher scores on sexual cybervictimization whereas males reported 
higher scores on direct cybervictimization. In high school, females endorsed higher 
scores on coercive and direct cyberaggression, as well as sexual cybervictimization and 
defamation. Males in high school endorsed more direct cybervictimization experiences. 
  White participants in college endorsed greater involvement in direct 
cyberaggression and cybervictimization; all other subscale mean scores were similar 
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Table 3.6 
Correlations, Reliability, and Descriptive Statistics of the CES Subscales (High School) 
 
 
 
Cyberaggression Subscales Cybervictimization Subscales 
Cyberaggression 
     Sex 
     Coercion 
     Direct 
Cybervictimization 
     Sex 
     Defamation 
     Direct 
 
Cronbach’s  
Coefficient α 
 
Factor Meana, b 
Sex 
1.00 
.23** 
.27* 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
 
.63 
 
.18 
Coercion 
-- 
1.00 
.29** 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
 
.88 
 
.94 
 
Direct 
-- 
-- 
1.00 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
 
.82 
 
5.92 
Sex 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
1.00 
.67** 
.50** 
 
 
.88 
 
1.37 
Defamation 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
-- 
1.00 
.78** 
 
 
.92 
 
2.84 
Direct 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
-- 
-- 
1.00 
 
 
.78 
 
5.46 
 
 
Note. n = 200. a = possible range of scores for cyberaggression: Sex = 0 – 25; Coercion = 
0 – 30; Direct = 0 – 45. b = possible range of scores for cybervictimization: Sex = 0 – 20; 
Defamation = 0 – 55; Direct = 0 – 25.  
*p < .05; **p < .001. 
 
between white and non-white college participants. In high school, non-white participants 
endorsed higher scores on sexual and coercive cyberaggression, whereas white 
participants endorsed greater involvement with direct cyberaggression as well as sexual 
cybervictimization, defamation, and direct cybervictimization. Means indicated similar 
rates of endorsement across all subscales among military-connected and civilian college 
participants. In high school, military-connected participants endorsed higher mean levels 
of sexual cybervictimization and defamation. Civilian high school participants endorsed 
higher mean-levels of direct cybervictimization and direct cyberaggression. 
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Table 3.7 
Correlations between the CES Subscales and Related Measures (College) 
Measure CES Cyberaggression CES Cybervictimization 
 
RCBI 
     Cyberbullying 
     Cybervictimization 
Sex 
 
-- 
-- 
Coercion 
 
-- 
-- 
Direct 
 
.31 
-- 
Sex 
 
-- 
.33 
Defamation 
 
-- 
.53 
Direct 
 
-- 
.50 
SRASBM 
  Relational Aggression 
     Reactive 
     Proactive 
     Cross-Gender 
     Relational Victimization 
 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
 
 
.32 
.45 
.33 
-- 
 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.35 
 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.37 
 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.27 
SDQ 
     Total Difficulties 
 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
.27 
 
.25 
 
.28 
 
.26 
 
Note: -- = no prediction hypothesized; RCBI = Revised Cyberbullying Inventory; 
SRASBM = Self-Report of Aggression and Social Behavior Measure; SDQ = Strengths 
and Difficulties Questionnaire. 
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Table 3.8 
Correlations between the CES Subscales and Related Measures (High School) 
Measure CES Cyberaggression CES Cybervictimization 
 
RCBI 
     Cyberbullying 
     Cybervictimization 
Sex 
 
-- 
-- 
Coercion 
 
.31 
-- 
Direct 
 
.27 
-- 
Sex 
 
-- 
.45 
Defamation 
 
-- 
.59 
Direct 
 
-- 
.30 
PCS  
     Reactive Overt 
     Reactive Relational 
     Proactive Overt 
     Proactive 
Relational 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
.41 
.37 
.28 
.37 
 
.30 
.36 
.24 
.28 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
SDQ 
     Prosocial 
 
-- 
 
-.03 
 
-.31 
 
-.12 
 
-.02 
 
-.17 
 
 
Note: -- = no prediction hypothesized; RCBI = Revised Cyberbullying Inventory;       
PCS = Peer Conflict Scale; SDQ = Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire. 
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Table 3.9 
Subscale Mean Scores across Demographics  
Model CES Cyberaggression CES Cybervictimization n 
College 
  Sex 
     Males 
     Females 
 
  Race/Ethnicity 
     White 
     Non-white 
 
  Military 
     Connected 
     Civilian 
      
Sex 
 
.58 
.26 
 
 
.28 
.42 
 
 
.45 
.30 
Coercion 
 
1.05  
.76  
 
 
.81 
.84 
 
 
.92 
.80 
Direct 
 
7.01  
6.20  
 
 
6.87 
4.43 
 
 
5.63 
6.41  
Sex 
 
1.46  
3.37 
 
 
3.04 
3.11 
 
 
2.88 
3.07 
Defamation 
 
3.41 
3.70  
 
 
3.65 
3.67 
 
 
3.90  
3.63 
Direct 
 
6.03 
5.42 
 
 
5.91 
4.23 
 
 
5.61 
5.53 
 
 
80 
378 
 
 
359 
103 
 
 
49 
413 
High School 
  Sex 
     Males 
     Females 
 
  Race/Ethnicity 
     White 
     Non-white 
 
  Military 
     Connected 
     Civilian 
 
 
 
.19 
.17 
 
 
.11 
.37 
 
 
.13 
.18 
 
 
.81 
1.08 
 
 
.70 
1.63 
 
 
.93 
.93 
 
 
5.72 
6.06  
 
 
6.34 
5.18  
 
 
4.40 
6.18 
 
 
.84 
1.83 
 
 
1.55 
.84 
 
 
2.60 
1.27 
 
 
2.69 
3.02 
 
 
2.99 
2.51 
 
 
3.60 
2.80 
 
 
5.78 
5.16 
 
 
6.03 
3.98 
 
 
4.47 
5.59 
 
 
94 
102 
 
 
148 
51 
 
 
15 
184 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
The present study had three goals: 
1. In light of nationally and internationally recognized issues of rigor and 
reproducibility (McNutt, 2014), we sought to evaluate evidence for construct 
validity of the CES using a novel sample of high school and college students. 
2. As a result of recent recommendations in cyberaggression research to advance 
psychometric evaluation in this field (Card, 2013), we also sought to evaluate 
aspects of measurement invariance of the CES across age as suggested by the 
CES developers (Doane et al., 2013) and which has yet to be explored  more 
broadly in the cyberaggression literature. 
3. Given prior evidence from research suggesting potential differences across 
demographic indicators such as sex, race/ethnicity, and military-connected status, 
we sought to investigate the frequency of cyberaggression and cybervictimization 
among these subgroups, the first of which to explore this among military-
connected youth. 
4.1 INITIAL MODELS Concerning our first goal, results indicated that the 
hypothesized four-factor cyberaggression and cybervictimization solutions did not meet 
cut-off recommendations for both absolute and incremental fit indices. These findings 
were likely influenced by several issues. First, there were numerous poorly performing 
cyberaggression and cybervictimization items. Six items on the cyberaggression
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unwanted contact subscale had 69-95% of the variance not accounted for, all items on the 
cyberaggression public humiliation subscale had 74-87% of the variance not accounted 
for, and six items on the cybervictimization public humiliation subscale had 84-98% of 
the variance not accounted for by their respective latent factors. Previous methodological 
work has indicated that a minimum of 50% variance explained in a given item by a latent 
factor for which is serves as an indicator is an appropriate standard (Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham, & Black, 1995). Regarding the cyberaggression unwanted contact subscale, four 
of these poorly performing items contained sexual content, were rarely endorsed, and 
weakly correlated with all other cyberaggression items. This suggests that their 
integration with non-sexual items may not optimally represent an overarching 
cyberaggression construct as sexual forms of aggression are distinct from other forms of 
aggression due to differential personality characteristics of perpetrators and impact on 
victims (Vega & Malamuth, 2007).  
 Concerning the public humiliation subscales, several items may not tap into an 
aggression construct. For example, one item states “Have you posted a picture 
electronically of someone doing something illegal?” and another reads “Has someone 
logged into your electronic account and changed your information?” Although the former 
item might prove problematic for the victim, illegal acts are a vague term and may 
involve behaviors which many youth participate in such as underage drinking at a party. 
The latter item assumes both negative intentions by the perpetrator, which may not exist, 
or the act being accomplished through a social media (e.g., Facebook) account where 
others may view the altered information. It appears that several poorly performing items 
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measure non-aggressive behaviors which may result in ineffective operationalization and 
measurement of the cyberaggression and cybervictimization constructs. 
 Several items also shared variance unrelated to the latent constructs in both 
solutions likely due to having similar item stems and repetitive content. Although model 
fit improved after including theoretically supported modification indices, the unwanted 
contact and deception subscales in the high school cyberaggression model strongly 
correlated (r = .99) which did not support configural invariance across age for the CES. 
Evaluation of the items in both of these subscales highlights that many items involve the 
use of coercive tactics by the perpetrator to either elicit a negative response by or obtain 
personal information from the victim (e.g., lying to the victim, asking what they are 
wearing, and asking where they are living). The unwanted contact subscale also 
contained the sexually related items which all relatively performed poorly. Sexual 
cyberaggression may operate differently among high school and college students as 
college is a time of sexual exploration for young adults where sexually related practices 
are more open and culturally accepted (Chng & Moore, 1994). High school students, 
however, frequently indicate that coercion or peer pressure led to them sending sexually 
explicit messages to other students (Dake et al., 2012). Future research should evaluate 
differential attitudes towards sexual behaviors in the cyber realm between high school 
and college students which may inform its inclusion in subsequent measures of 
cyberaggression. 
 4.1.1 RESIVED MODEL Revisions supported a three-factor solution for the 
cyberaggression and cybervictimization subscales which was consistent with initial EFA 
findings in the original CES evaluation (Doane et al., 2013). These revisions were made 
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based on theory regarding item content as well as statistical considerations including 
inter-item correlations and factor loadings (Appendix D). Although fit indices supported 
these revisions, several limitations remained including poor internal consistency across 
three subscales (i.e., sexual cyberaggression, coercion, and sexual cybervictimization) 
and low variance accounted for in the items by their respective latent factors.  
 Overall, our findings are in contrast to the results reported in the original CES 
investigation (Doane et al., 2013). Given the general lack of support for the CES and 
other measures being used in the literature (Berne et al., 2013), as well as the specific 
measurement limitations addressed in the current study, there are two overarching 
insights for future research in this area: 1) the conceptualization and operationalization of 
cyberaggression appears in need of revision and 2) the development of a screening 
instrument which would retain fewer items to highlight the most relevant aspects of 
cyberaggression as informed by research, remove unnecessary model complexity, and 
have the greatest potential to impact future research, clinical practice, and policy should 
be considered.  
4.2 ISSUES IN CONCEPTUALIZATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION  
There are seemingly several issues in the current conceptualization and 
operationalization of cyberaggression and cybervictimization. As previously mentioned, 
two issues are a lack of agreement on the definition of cyberaggression as well as the use 
of inconsistent terminology (e.g., cyberaggression, cyberbullying, cyberharassment). 
Research has shown that language semantics impact response patterns to cyberaggression 
instruments and the populations which researchers primarily seek to evaluate these 
experiences (i.e., K-12 and college) have varying conceptualizations of what aggression 
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or bullying entails (Grigg, 2010; Menesini & Nocentini, 2009). A call for deliberation by 
field experts to come to a mutual agreement on the construct of interest and its definition 
is a necessary first step to progress these lines of research as compared to the current 
practice of developing isolated research, measures, and intervention programs. The 
current study has suggested the field focus on the construct of cyberaggression as this 
term is broader and more accurately captures the type of behaviors currently assessed by 
existing instrumentation. 
Once cyberaggression is identified as the definitive construct of interest, research 
should then focus on what aspects of these behaviors are most important in terms of 
clinical impact and policy directives. Numerous conceptualizations have been posited 
including organizing cyberaggression experiences based on electronic modality (i.e., 
cyberaggression via text messages, social media websites, or e-mail), public versus 
private experiences (e.g., having an embarrassing picture posted online as compared to 
receiving a mean text message on your personal phone), or possible intentions (e.g., to 
malaise or deceive) of the perpetrator as observed in the CES (e.g., Doane et al., 2013; 
Menesini, Nocentini, & Calussi, 2011). It is clear that the field is attempting to determine 
a severity spectrum of cyberaggression acts to inform research and clinical practice. 
Focus groups with adolescents and young adults may serve as a useful methodological 
approach to evaluate and identify which conceptualizations resonate with the populations 
of interest, given constant technological advancements and that these behaviors may 
developmentally differ across age groups. 
Another commonplace practice is to operationalize cyberaggression in terms of 
mirrored-item content to simultaneously evaluate both perpetration acts and victimization 
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experiences. Clinicians and policymakers seek to evaluate both perspectives on 
cyberaggression but possibly for different purposes. Regarding cybervictimization, there 
are apparent reasons to identify those who have been cybervictimized including the 
impact on mental health and for the development of effective intervention programs. In 
terms of how existing measures operationalize these experiences, respondents are 
typically asked to report how frequently a particular incident has occurred to them over a 
specified time period. That is, there is usually no attempt to assess the respondent’s 
perceptions of or reactions to these experiences about whether they viewed them as an act 
of aggression or intention to harm on the behalf of the perpetrator. Mental health 
providers and even law enforcement officials may therefore find it difficult to intervene 
in such cases unless there is a serious and substantial threat to a victim’s personal safety 
which may necessarily be difficult to determine given the complexities of the cyber realm 
(Hinduja & Patchin, 2008; Notar, Padgett, & Roden, 2013). Future instrumentation will 
need to address both prevalence rates and perceived harm from the cybervictim’s 
perspective to best inform clinical practice and policy. 
Concerning cyberaggression perpetration, clinicians are also interested in mental 
health difficulties experienced by these individuals yet policies surrounding perpetration 
tend to focus more on discipline, litigation, or even criminal prosecution (Beale & Hall, 
2007). Notar, Padgett, and Roden (2013) describe how it is generally not illegal to use 
electronic communication to mistreat, tease, or even harass others because of First 
Amendment protection. Although these behaviors may cross the legal line into 
“harassment” or “stalking,” current instruments do not necessarily include items to 
evaluate harassing or stalking behaviors as traditionally defined. As such, 
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cyberaggression perpetration is potentially more difficult to evaluate from a policy 
perspective due to current instrumentation not following existing definitions of illegal 
human interactions. From a measurement perspective, cyberaggression perpetration is 
likewise more challenging to evaluate as it involves issues such as social desirability 
response bias and item ambiguity. For example, a CES cyberaggression item states, 
“Have you cursed at someone electronically?” A perpetrator may respond that they curse 
at their friends electronically but does not interpret those acts as being aggressive; their 
friend, on the other hand, may view those interactions in a negative manner unbeknownst 
to the perpetrator. Language involving the individual’s intent rather than assuming intent 
to harm is needed in cyberaggression perpetration measures. This example highlights that 
current practice of using identical or mirrored item stems to evaluate perpetration and 
victimization may not best capture the construct as they involve different psychological 
perspectives and policy motives.  
4.3 DEVELOPING A CYBERAGGRESSION SCREENING INSTRUMENT 
 Although the field is quickly growing due to the increasing need to understand 
and monitor cyberaggression, measurement and instrumentation remain in early 
development. In order to begin addressing the aforementioned issues, it is recommended 
that developing a screening instrument be considered. Screeners typically serve three 
main purposes: 1) cost-effectiveness, 2) decrease burden on the respondent, and 3) case 
identification in clinical or research contexts (Burnam, Wells, Leake, & Landsverk, 
1988). Most, if not all, cyberaggression instruments derive responses from self-report 
which are both consistent with traditional aggression and bullying measurement strategies 
(Vivolo-Kantor, Martell, Holland, & Westby, 2014) and contribute to the cost-
 65 
 
effectiveness of these instruments. Although limitations in self-reporting are well 
documented (e.g., Stone, Bachrach, Jobe, Kurtzman, & Cain, 1999), self-report may 
prove to be the most effective strategy for identifying cyberaggression experiences as the 
cyber context presents several challenges in monitoring behaviors by other commonly 
used reporters (e.g., parents and teachers) such as limited technological knowledge and 
access to the person of interest’s electronic accounts. 
Screeners also decrease the burden on the respondent by only highlighting core 
aspects of the construct of interest and removing unnecessary measurement complexity 
by retaining fewer items which strongly perform in initial evaluation studies. Single-item 
measures have currently been developed and used in the literature (e.g., Olweus 
Bully/Victim Questionnaire; Solberg & Olweus, 2003). These single-item measures, 
however, typically lack precision, are too narrowly defined, and lack construct validation 
(Berne et al., 2013; Vivolo-Kantor et al., 2014). A screener instrument would serve as a 
balance between overly complex and single-item measures which are too limited in scope 
to hold research or clinical utility. Results from this and other evaluation studies can 
inform what critical items to include in a screener measure as there are no formal 
“diagnostic criteria” for cyberaggression on which to imitate.  
A minimal number of items to establish acceptable internal consistency reliability 
are recommended. Commonly used screeners such as the Patient Health Questionnaire-4 
include as few as four items, for example (Kroenke, Spitzer, Williams, & Löwe, 2009). 
Maintaining a minimal number of items further expands usage of a screener to other 
research methodologies. Longitudinal evaluation, for example, is an important 
methodological approach in clinical and research contexts where measures that are 
 66 
 
conducive for follow-up are needed. As the cyber realm is complex and constantly 
changing due to the introduction of new technologies, a quick and precise screener would 
hold utility for longitudinally evaluating these experiences and subsequent behavioral 
health impact. 
 It is likewise important to consider what an effective cyberaggression screener 
may look like. Other areas in psychology that evaluate behavioral health issues such as 
mood or trauma-related sequelae (e.g., posttraumatic stress disorder; PTSD) utilize 
screeners for case identification. For example, the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-
9; Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001) and PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5; 
Weather et al., 2013) are the gold standards for briefly assessing depression and PTSD, 
respectively. These instruments involve answering multiple self-report items (9 items on 
the PHQ and 20 items on the PCL-5) and summing scores from these items to assign 
respondents to one of several categories which identify them at a certain risk level for 
meeting diagnostic criteria for depression or PTSD. The clinician or administrator is then 
allowed flexibility in following up on the responses to address both intricacies not 
covered by the screeners and behavioral health impact.  
In clinical contexts, a cyberaggression screener may involve a similar approach by 
identifying whether a cyberaggression experience has occurred or not and saving 
complexities of the event (e.g., anonymous perpetrator, modality, and mental health 
impact) for the clinical follow-up interview. As endorsement rates of cyberaggression 
experiences remains relatively low (Modecki et al., 2014), including broadly worded 
items (e.g., “via electronic communication” as compared to “on Facebook”) or items 
asking about the most prevalent forms of cyberaggression (e.g., mean text messages, with 
 67 
 
intent to harm) is recommended. In research contexts without immediate clinical follow-
up capabilities, including a few items in the screener pertaining to the behavioral health 
impact of these experiences if endorsed (Bauman, 2013) or expanding research into the 
various severity levels of cyberaggression experiences (Menesini,  Nocentini, & Calussi, 
2011) may prove useful. The screener may utilize an adaptive item format where if a 
respondent endorses experiencing cyberaggression, the respondent will subsequently be 
asked to rate how much of an impact this experience had on their well-being during a 
certain time period. This item format may also be used to inquire further details about the 
experience (e.g., modality, frequency) only if an item is endorsed. Examples of these 
types of item formatting are observed in emerging clinical intake and assessment 
software programs to inform evaluation and routine outcome monitoring such as OWL 
Outcome Assessments (Peterson & Fagan, 2017). 
To provide a preliminary screener example, a two-factor model derived from the 
original CES was constructed and evaluated for both cyberaggression and 
cybervictimization items. The items selected for the cyberaggression model included 
items 1, 4, 6, and 9 for the “direct cyberaggression” subscale and items 15, 18, 19, and 20 
for the “coercion” subscale (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). These items were selected based on 
inter-item correlations, factor loadings, removal of all sexually related items due to poor 
performance, and item content to capture broad facets of direct and indirect forms of 
cyberaggression without repeating unnecessary item content. Results indicated that this 
two-factor solution met both absolute and incremental fit indices’ recommended cut-offs 
as well as demonstrated acceptable internal consistency reliability in both the college and 
high school samples (Table 4.1). Results therefore strongly support these revisions. 
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Figure 4.1. Results from the CES cyberaggression two-factor solution for college 
students. Standardized factor loadings, error terms, and correlated factor/error terms are 
presented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Results from the CES cyberaggression two-factor solution for high school 
students. Standardized factor loadings, error terms, and correlated factor/error terms are 
presented.  
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Table 4.1 
Goodness-of-Fit Indicators for Proposed 2-Factor Cyberaggression Screener 
 
Model 
 
 
MLM χ2 
 
df 
 
RMSEA 
 
CFI 
 
SRMR 
 
α# 
College 22.41* 18 .02 .99 .03 .78/.70 
High School 
 
13.44* 18 .00 1.00 .05 .82/.76 
 
*p > .05 
#Direct cyberaggression/Coercion 
 
The items selected for the 2-factor cybervictimization model included items 9, 11, 
12 and 13 for the “direct cybervictimization” subscale and items 1, 19, 20, and 21 for the 
“deception” subscale (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). These items were selected based on the same 
rationale as the cyberaggression items. Results indicated that this 2-factor solution met 
both absolute and incremental fit indices’ recommended cut-offs as well as demonstrated 
acceptable internal consistency reliability in both student samples (Table 4.2). Results 
again support these revisions. 
The benefits of this example screener include the removal of poorly performing 
items and improvement of parsimony by simplifying the construct operationalization 
which has been identified as a major issue in the field (Menesini & Nocentini, 2009). Of 
course, not all facets or types of cyberaggression are included in such a screener although 
that is not the primary purpose. As the measurement of this form of cyberaggression 
appears in its preliminary stages, it is difficult to for research to subsequently inform law 
and policy surrounding this issue, especially given the complexities of the cyber realm 
(e.g., public vs. private, item content, intention of perpetrator, and modality). 
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Figure 4.3. Results from the CES cybervictimization two-factor solution for college 
students. Standardized factor loadings, error terms, and correlated factors are presented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Results from the CES cybervictimization two-factor solution for high school 
students. Standardized factor loadings, error terms, and correlated factors are presented.  
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Table 4.2 
Goodness-of-Fit Indicators for Proposed 2-Factor Cybervictimization Screener 
 
Model 
 
 
MLM χ2 
 
df 
 
RMSEA 
 
CFI 
 
SRMR 
 
α# 
College 26.86* 19 .03 .99 .03 .81/.72 
High School 
 
27.83* 19 .05 .97 .05 .83/.70 
 
*p > .05 
#Direct cybervictimization/Deception 
 
The development and scoring of screener items may therefore prove challenging 
as the process will need to consider numerous measurement issues and deciding how best 
to inform research, clinical practice, and policy. As mentioned, policy directives 
primarily care about establishing prevalence rates and determining harm. Accurate 
measurement and scoring of cyberaggression items is thus an important issue in screener 
development to assess prevalence rates. Many cyberaggression instruments attempt to 
measure the frequency of these experiences using a continuous variable Likert scale 
format. In some instances, such as in the present study however, substantial floor effects 
are observed in the data as there is little variability among rated frequencies of 
cyberaggression. In their evaluation of the Cyberbullying Scale, Menesini, Nocentini, and 
Calussi (2011) dichotomized participants’ responses to accommodate substantial floor 
effect observed in their data. As policy is driven by prevalence rates that are frequently 
determined on a “yes/no” basis, it is important for future measurement research to 
consider whether cyberaggression is most effectively measured on a dichotomous 
“yes/no” or continuous variable format. Lastly, in assessing harm, screener development 
will have to consider whether and how to simultaneously evaluate both perpetration and 
victimization perspectives. Research suggests that individuals who are identified as a 
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combination of perpetrator and victim experience the poorest behavioral health outcomes 
(e.g., Cassidy, Faucher, & Jackson, 2013). Thus, it may prove essential to evaluate both 
cyberaggression perpetration and victimization, with the consideration that 
operationalizing both aspects may require attention to item wording to lessen ambiguity 
and social response biases as compared to utilizing mirrored-item content across scales. 
4.4 IMPLICATIONS OF NOMOLOGICAL NET ANALYSES 
 Investigation into convergent validity evidence for the CES yielded support for 
the majority of hypotheses. Of note, moderate correlations were observed between the 
cyberaggression and cybervictimization subscales and mental health difficulties in the 
college sample. Our results reflect prior research that has also indicated that both 
cyberaggressors and cybervictims experience mental health issues such as depression, 
anxiety, and suicidal ideation (Landoll et al., 2015; Schenk et al., 2013). There was a 
weak correlation observed between the direct cyberaggression subscale and proactive 
overt aggression subscale on the PCS in the high school sample. Cyberaggression 
research has remained inconclusive as to whether this act is a proactive or reactive form 
of aggression, although qualitative research has revealed that cyberaggressors attribute 
their negative online behaviors to extract revenge as compared to causing harm 
proactively (Hinduja & Patchin, 2008; Law, Shapka, Domene, & Gagné, 2012). These 
qualitative findings may inform the development of cyberaggression items in that 
language related to revenge or reactive behaviors should be integrated in item content. 
 As previously mentioned, several subscale correlations (e.g., sexual 
cyberaggression) were not estimated as they did not meet acceptable internal consistency 
reliability standards. Future research should expand upon the nomological net in the 
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present study once additional evidence is provided for the underlying factor structure and 
internal consistency reliability of all CES subscales. Likewise, as further evidence is 
provided for the conceptualization and operationalization of these constructs, exploration 
into discriminative validity evidence is also needed as the present investigation only 
evaluated evidence for convergent validity. 
4.5 IMPLICATIONS OF DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES  
 Several mean differences were observed between demographic groups across 
cyberaggression and cybervictimization subscales. Males endorsed higher frequencies of 
perpetrating cyberaggression in college whereas females generally endorsed higher 
frequencies of cyberaggression in high school. Females in both college and high school, 
however, reported more experiences of sexual cybervictimization where males in college 
and high school reported more experiences of direct cybervictimization. This difference 
may also be attributed to sex differences that are observed in face-to-face aggression 
where females typically endorse experiencing greater rates of sexual victimization and 
males participating in more direct or overt forms of aggressive behavior such as berating 
or cursing (Dooley, Pyżalski, & Cross, 2009). 
 Concerning race/ethnicity, white participants were generally more involved in 
both cyberaggression and cybervictimization as compared to non-white participants in 
both college and high school samples. Our results contribute to the already mixed 
evidence as to whether prevalence rates of cyberaggression differ across various racial 
and ethnic populations (e.g., Bauman, Toomey, & Walker, 2013). Along with conducting 
additional prevalence studies, future research may consider whether experiences of 
cyberaggression and cybervictimization have a differential psychological impact on racial 
 74 
 
and ethnic populations and whether the types of cyberaggression experienced vary across 
these groups.  
 Means indicated similar endorsement in cyberaggression and cybervictimization 
among military-connected and civilian college participants; military-connected 
participants in high school reported higher mean levels of sexual cybervictimization and 
defamation, whereas civilian participants endorsed higher mean levels of direct 
cybervictimization. Although traditional aggression research has indicated higher 
frequencies of victimization among military-connected youth (Atuel et al., 2014), 
additional research on experiences of cyberaggression with a more representative military 
youth sample is needed. These initial results also highlight the need for additional 
research utilizing more advanced statistical techniques to evaluate cyberaggression and 
cybervictimization across demographic groups. Valid instrumentation is a necessary 
prerequisite, however, to progress the field in this direction. 
4.6 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS  
There are several strengths to the present study. First, our study was one of the 
first investigations to fully examine a novel measure of cyberaggression and 
cybervictimization utilizing comprehensive, psychometric methodologies. Second, this is 
one of the first studies to address both cyberaggression and cybervictimization across age 
groups using a high school and college student sample. Considering limited research on 
college students (Schenk et al., 2013) and need for a measure which can be used over 
developmental time periods, we attempted to capture information to advance these lines 
of research. Third, our study is one of the first to suggest and provide preliminary 
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evaluation for a cyberaggression/cybervictimization screener as a call for brief and 
effective measurement in this field. 
 The generalizability of our high school and college samples may be limited. High 
school participants attended a private school which may differentiate these participants 
based on sociodemographic and other indicators from the high school student population 
at-large. Our college student sample was also largely homogenous (i.e., predominantly 
female and white) which may impact score distributions and observed factor or intra-
measure correlations. Lastly, a third limitation is that the present study did not directly 
investigate discriminative validity evidence for the CES. With the novel state of 
measurement in this field, future research should seek to concurrently assess both 
convergent and divergent validity evidence for the CES and other developed measures. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
Measurement in the field of cyberaggression and cybervictimization has become a 
recent focus of research yet is limited in both its scope and evaluation. The CES is one of 
the few measures of cyberaggression and cybervictimization to be thoroughly analyzed 
through validated statistical methodologies. However, evaluation of the CES highlighted 
several areas for improvement which reflected the lack of uniformity, unnecessary 
complexity, and ultimately the overall ineffective measurement strategies discerned in 
current cyberaggression instrumentation. Given the cultural embeddedness of technology 
and electronic communication, it will be challenging to develop valid instrumentation to 
inform policies that consider a balance between recognizing the social desire to connect 
and communicate in the modern era as well as consequences associated with negative 
online/electronic behaviors. It is recommended that the development of a cyberaggression 
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screening instrument to address the notable measurement issues observed in the field and 
to effectively inform policy directives be considered.  
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APPENDIX A: INTER-ITEM CORRELATIONS FOR THE CES ITEMS 
Table A.1  
Inter-item Correlations for CES Cyberaggression Items (College) 
                    
                      CES1         CES2        CES3         CES4         CES5 
 CES1            1.000 
 CES2            0.138         1.000 
 CES3            0.099         0.283         1.000 
 CES4            0.149         0.167         0.415         1.000 
 CES5           -0.029        -0.002         0.136         0.112        1.000 
 CES6            0.032         0.151         0.200         0.200         0.242 
 CES7            0.172         0.273         0.058         0.154         0.022 
 CES8            0.144         0.203         0.146         0.098        -0.012 
 CES9            0.124         0.129         0.136         0.155         0.093 
 CES10          0.018         0.078         0.200         0.116         0.111 
 CES11          0.030         0.063         0.130         0.124         0.139 
 CES12          0.029         0.052         0.099         0.106         0.112 
 CES13          0.077         0.071         0.191         0.158         0.103 
 CES14          0.105         0.122         0.132         0.050         0.055 
 CES15          0.041         0.103         0.106         0.188         0.090 
 CES16          0.072         0.181         0.129         0.104         0.138 
 CES17          0.002         0.213         0.092         0.130         0.020 
 CES18         -0.015         0.068         0.090         0.027         0.022 
 CES19          0.012         0.017         0.028        -0.005        -0.020 
 CES20         -0.018         0.068         0.134         0.067         0.071 
 
                      CES6        CES7         CES8         CES9         CES10 
 CES6            1.000 
 CES7            0.170         1.000 
 CES8            0.070         0.197         1.000 
 CES9            0.220         0.214         0.178         1.000 
 CES10          0.285         0.103         0.176         0.538         1.000 
 CES11          0.183         0.083         0.113         0.674         0.580 
 CES12          0.172         0.072         0.115         0.625         0.590 
 CES13          0.183         0.119         0.192         0.545         0.690 
 CES14          0.156         0.108         0.168         0.592         0.461 
 CES15          0.313         0.055         0.096         0.194         0.229 
 CES16          0.291        -0.010         0.126         0.161         0.147 
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 CES17          0.321         0.159         0.196         0.342         0.390 
 CES18          0.116        -0.019         0.134         0.300         0.360 
 CES19          0.123         0.020         0.100         0.214         0.275 
 CES20          0.079         0.048         0.098         0.310         0.281 
 
                      CES11       CES12       CES13      CES14      CES15 
 CES11          1.000 
 CES12          0.844         1.000 
 CES13          0.727         0.758         1.000 
 CES14          0.619         0.649         0.519         1.000 
 CES15          0.264         0.246         0.231         0.109         1.000 
 CES16          0.201         0.193         0.171         0.191         0.451 
 CES17          0.395         0.386         0.397         0.303         0.444 
 CES18          0.333         0.307         0.325         0.330         0.166 
 CES18          0.266         0.292         0.278         0.260         0.209 
 CES20          0.311         0.311         0.310         0.377         0.194 
 
                      CES16       CES17       CES18      CES19       CES20 
 CES16          1.000 
 CES17          0.302         1.000 
 CES18          0.183         0.243         1.000 
 CES19          0.205         0.294         0.551         1.000 
 CES20          0.226         0.251         0.435         0.405         1.000 
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Table A.2  
Inter-item Correlations for CES Cybervictimization Items (College) 
                     
                     CES1        CES2         CES3         CES4         CES5 
 CES1           1.000 
 CES2           0.324         1.000 
 CES3           0.184         0.472         1.000 
 CES4           0.212         0.375         0.288         1.000 
 CES5           0.189         0.355         0.291         0.322         1.000 
 CES6           0.173         0.361         0.334         0.285         0.374 
 CES7           0.144         0.208         0.149         0.195         0.142 
 CES8           0.363         0.263         0.237         0.408         0.194 
 CES9           0.175         0.319         0.281         0.131         0.126 
 CES10          0.189         0.298         0.496         0.201         0.211 
 CES11          0.179         0.344         0.508         0.191         0.247 
 CES12          0.169         0.328         0.419         0.282         0.201 
 CES13          0.190         0.345         0.396         0.191         0.197 
 CES14          0.174         0.351         0.398         0.190         0.187 
 CES15          0.210         0.233         0.351         0.222         0.286 
 CES16          0.177         0.165         0.280         0.141         0.163 
 CES17          0.202         0.180         0.270         0.205         0.150 
 CES18          0.192         0.223         0.274         0.152         0.191 
 CES19          0.336         0.246         0.274         0.198         0.176 
 CES20          0.304         0.301         0.359         0.167         0.229 
 CES21          0.244         0.215         0.205         0.171         0.251 
 
                     CES6         CES7        CES8          CES9        CES10 
 CES6           1.000 
 CES7           0.151         1.000 
 CES8           0.243         0.127         1.000 
 CES9           0.185         0.134         0.259         1.000 
 CES10          0.175         0.093         0.228         0.329         1.000 
 CES11          0.213         0.071         0.268         0.305         0.851 
 CES12          0.185         0.027         0.267         0.308         0.623 
 CES13          0.222         0.046         0.264         0.408         0.649 
 CES14          0.217         0.075         0.255         0.414         0.574 
 CES15          0.190         0.126         0.232         0.293         0.382 
 CES16          0.167         0.115         0.223         0.243         0.337 
 CES17          0.182         0.118         0.229         0.267         0.317 
 CES18          0.217         0.160         0.182         0.251         0.384 
 CES19          0.182         0.267         0.288         0.183         0.319 
 CES20          0.348         0.192         0.301         0.268         0.431 
 CES21          0.147         0.333         0.236         0.081         0.267 
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                      CES11       CES12       CES13      CES14       CES15 
 CES11          1.000 
 CES12          0.677         1.000 
 CES13          0.701         0.663         1.000 
 CES14          0.634         0.616         0.820         1.000 
 CES15          0.388         0.368         0.316         0.355         1.000 
 CES16          0.328         0.308         0.274         0.327         0.851 
 CES17          0.354         0.334         0.282         0.335         0.760 
 CES18          0.360         0.361         0.345         0.308         0.707 
 CES19          0.299         0.252         0.258         0.304         0.391 
 CES20          0.414         0.410         0.417         0.411         0.483 
 CES21          0.245         0.204         0.205         0.204         0.357 
 
                     CES16        CES17       CES18      CES19       CES20      CES21 
 CES16          1.000 
 CES17          0.781         1.000 
 CES18          0.735         0.662         1.000 
 CES19          0.384         0.372         0.417         1.000 
 CES20          0.476         0.526         0.526         0.566         1.000 
 CES21          0.341         0.316         0.331         0.428         0.473         1.000 
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 Table A.3  
Inter-item Correlations for CES Cyberaggression Items (High School) 
                      
                      CES1         CES2         CES3        CES4         CES5 
 CES1            1.000 
 CES2            0.189         1.000 
 CES3            0.156         0.372         1.000 
 CES4            0.101         0.115         0.893         1.000 
 CES5            0.015         0.102         0.045         0.028         1.000 
 CES6           -0.010         0.163         0.296         0.307         0.377 
 CES7            0.116         0.205         0.235         0.155         0.059 
 CES8           -0.011         0.124         0.051         0.001         0.424 
 CES9            0.106         0.146         0.245         0.182         0.145 
 CES10          0.087         0.114         0.194         0.144         0.170 
 CES11          0.096         0.177         0.234         0.160         0.167 
 CES12          0.068         0.155         0.203         0.138         0.073 
 CES13          0.048         0.156         0.147         0.101         0.157 
 CES14          0.085         0.051         0.126         0.081         0.147 
 CES15          0.057         0.172         0.233         0.233         0.559 
 CES16          0.026         0.158         0.339         0.329         0.652 
 CES17          0.145         0.104         0.236         0.212         0.507 
 CES18          0.033         0.134         0.075        -0.004         0.050 
 CES19          0.033         0.204         0.162         0.058         0.087 
 CES20          0.046         0.096         0.076         0.008         0.080 
 
                      CES6        CES7         CES8         CES9         CES10 
 CES6            1.000 
 CES7            0.284         1.000 
 CES8            0.073         0.069         1.000 
 CES9            0.287         0.108         0.235         1.000 
 CES10          0.171         0.124         0.173         0.720         1.000 
 CES11          0.246         0.035         0.196         0.701         0.619 
 CES12          0.228         0.198         0.106         0.634         0.664 
 CES13          0.192         0.156         0.204         0.628         0.674 
 CES14          0.179         0.056         0.207         0.614         0.596 
 CES15          0.239         0.093         0.531         0.236         0.227 
 CES16          0.238         0.093         0.447         0.119         0.120 
 CES17          0.314        -0.028         0.307         0.343         0.299 
 CES18          0.053         0.026         0.185         0.334         0.446 
 CES19          0.034         0.119         0.206         0.223         0.131 
 CES20          0.014         0.074         0.098         0.339         0.265 
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                      CES11       CES12      CES13       CES14       CES15 
 CES11          1.000 
 CES12          0.802         1.000 
 CES13          0.753         0.847         1.000 
 CES14          0.656         0.666         0.643         1.000 
 CES15          0.245         0.203         0.311         0.201         1.000 
 CES16          0.121         0.036         0.154         0.129         0.724 
 CES17          0.326         0.211         0.276         0.264         0.603 
 CES18          0.344         0.422         0.512         0.400         0.236 
 CES19          0.346         0.300         0.338         0.235         0.234 
 CES20          0.337         0.410         0.438         0.419         0.192 
 
                      CES16       CES17       CES18       CES19      CES20 
 CES16          1.000 
 CES17          0.521         1.000 
 CES18          0.135         0.272         1.000 
 CES19          0.171         0.180         0.388         1.000 
 CES20          0.118         0.116         0.341         0.398         1.000 
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Table A.4  
Inter-item Correlations for CES Cybervictimization Items (High School) 
                     
                     CES1         CES2        CES3         CES4         CES5 
 CES1           1.000 
 CES2           0.553         1.000 
 CES3           0.236         0.294         1.000 
 CES4           0.271         0.082         0.074         1.000 
 CES5           0.205         0.292         0.266         0.051         1.000 
 CES6           0.327         0.324         0.291         0.092         0.218 
 CES7           0.171         0.204         0.046         0.001        -0.029 
 CES8           0.277         0.175         0.153         0.513         0.265 
 CES9           0.347         0.375         0.385         0.228         0.253 
 CES10          0.154         0.347         0.553         0.053         0.110 
 CES11          0.182         0.243         0.651         0.082         0.115 
 CES12          0.189         0.229         0.421         0.085         0.052 
 CES13          0.240         0.300         0.565         0.126         0.139 
 CES14          0.265         0.256         0.384         0.142         0.105 
 CES15          0.274         0.206         0.401         0.070         0.286 
 CES16          0.214         0.273         0.400        -0.014         0.364 
 CES17          0.218         0.205         0.455        -0.085         0.264 
 CES18          0.105         0.167         0.476        -0.070         0.203 
 CES19          0.310         0.258         0.646         0.141         0.173 
 CES20          0.347         0.299         0.475         0.016         0.145 
 CES21          0.106         0.145         0.186        -0.054         0.152 
 
                     CES6         CES7        CES8         CES9         CES10 
 CES6           1.000 
 CES7           0.179         1.000 
 CES8           0.089         0.182         1.000 
 CES9           0.260         0.047         0.469         1.000 
 CES10          0.219         0.003         0.165         0.399         1.000 
 CES11          0.188        -0.005         0.209         0.428         0.802 
 CES12          0.201         0.022         0.241         0.410         0.646 
 CES13          0.164         0.026         0.305         0.427         0.729 
 CES14          0.199        -0.011         0.313         0.413         0.642 
 CES15          0.224         0.158         0.192         0.437         0.284 
 CES16          0.166        -0.040         0.067         0.400         0.309 
 CES17          0.209         0.046         0.053         0.386         0.354 
 CES18          0.183         0.095         0.121         0.343         0.359 
 CES19          0.233         0.114         0.320         0.340         0.434 
 CES20          0.208         0.064         0.262         0.335         0.432 
 CES21         -0.016         0.131         0.061         0.163         0.099 
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                      CES11       CES12       CES13      CES14       CES15 
 CES11          1.000 
 CES12          0.620         1.000 
 CES13          0.742         0.638         1.000 
 CES14          0.613         0.665         0.800         1.000 
 CES15          0.303         0.383         0.280         0.286         1.000 
 CES16          0.361         0.301         0.294         0.216         0.749 
 CES17          0.446         0.412         0.337         0.290         0.662 
 CES18          0.425         0.262         0.353         0.310         0.492 
 CES19          0.507         0.310         0.495         0.431         0.261 
 CES20          0.498         0.420         0.437         0.461         0.342 
 CES21          0.187         0.187         0.119         0.150         0.333 
 
                      CES16      CES17        CES18       CES19       CES20        CES21 
 CES16          1.000 
 CES17          0.767         1.000 
 CES18          0.602         0.662         1.000 
 CES19          0.307         0.375         0.442         1.000  
 CES20          0.303         0.417         0.492         0.650         1.000 
 CES21          0.314         0.377         0.309         0.308         0.418           1.000 
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APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE CES ITEMS 
 
Table B.1 
 
Item Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness, and Kurtosis for the CES Items (College) 
 
Item Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
 
#1 
 
0.06 
 
.32 
 
6.39 
 
45.55 
#2 0.10 .32 3.51 12.53 
#3 0.05 .26 6.68 53.60 
#4 0.06 .30 5.76 38.09 
#5 0.02 .14 6.25 37.02 
#6 0.12 .40 3.97 18.18 
#7 0.05 .26 5.29 29.73 
#8 0.12 .41 4.59 27.66 
#9 0.87 .97 1.08 0.74 
#10 0.79 1.07 1.58 2.28 
#11 0.77 .97 1.32 1.37 
#12 0.73 1.01 1.52 1.97 
#13 0.74 1.08 1.68 2.58 
#14 1.39 1.48 0.99 -0.03 
#15 0.13 .40 3.51 14.91 
#16 0.05 .24 5.22 29.27 
#17 0.36 .73 2.32 5.74 
#18 0.43 .79 2.11 4.57 
#19 0.15 .48 3.94 18.78 
#20 0.45 .81 2.09 4.72 
#21 0.16 .45 3.16 11.06 
#22 0.16 .45 3.17 11.01 
#23 0.48 .69 1.38 1.70 
#24 0.22 .49 2.59 9.26 
#25 0.04 .26 7.41 62.41 
#26 0.26 .63 2.79 8.14 
#27 0.06 .30 6.43 50.18 
#28 0.28 .56 2.09 4.49 
#29 0.75 .92 1.22 1.16 
#30 0.91 .99 1.11 1.09 
#31 1.03 .97 0.98 1.04 
#32 1.52 1.40 0.93 0.12 
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#33 1.05 1.07 1.26 1.75 
#34 1.03 1.10 1.30 1.76 
#35 0.79 .97 1.07 0.28 
#36 0.69 .92 1.22 0.78 
#37 0.97 1.00 0.90 0.36 
#38 0.60 .87 1.56 2.48 
#39 0.34 .61 1.80 2.79 
#40 0.75 .92 1.29 1.87 
#41 0.21 .54 3.45 17.45 
     
 
Note: n = 463. Items 1-20 = Cyberaggression, Items 21-41 = Cybervictimization 
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Table B.2 
 
Item Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness, and Kurtosis for the CES Items (High 
School) 
 
Item Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
 
#1 
 
0.06 
 
.40 
 
10.16 
 
118.62 
#2 0.02 .39 7.94 61.02 
#3 0.04 .20 6.56 46.70 
#4 0.04 .30 10.58 124.44 
#5 0.05 .35 8.95 90.62 
#6 0.11 .42 4.24 18.76 
#7 0.03 .20 8.18 72.08 
#8 0.12 .55 5.46 31.44 
#9 0.78 1.03 1.44 1.57 
#10 0.89 1.21 1.55 1.92 
#11 0.70 1.14 1.81 2.70 
#12 0.78 1.25 1.74 2.26 
#13 0.78 1.23 1.95 3.31 
#14 1.31 1.68 1.04 -0.33 
#15 0.20 .57 4.22 24.88 
#16 0.09 .45 7.62 71.56 
#17 0.36 .76 2.62 8.28 
#18 0.27 .67 3.32 14.34 
#19 0.09 .35 4.82 28.29 
#20 0.32 .88 3.26 11.01 
#21 0.16 .51 3.52 12.74 
#22 0.18 .49 9.16 2.44 
#23 0.44 .39 6.28 3.71 
#24 0.15 .45 16.70 7.94 
#25 0.02 .41 61.02 2.79 
#26 0.17 .26 6.95 4.72 
#27 0.07 .44 23.48 3.29 
#28 0.19 .54 11.68 1.54 
#29 0.46 .75 1.46 1.42 
#30 0.91 1.23 1.20 1.70 
#31 0.87 1.21 2.55 2.55 
#32 1.60 1.73 0.90 -0.57 
#33 0.93 1.25 1.38 0.95 
#34 1.15 1.40 1.27 0.68 
#35 0.35 .71 2.18 4.72 
#36 0.26 .59 2.45 5.67 
#37 0.39 .75 2.10 4.20 
#38 0.36 .80 2.49 5.98 
#39 0.34 .71 2.60 7.71 
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#40 0.59 .92 1.48 1.42 
#41 0.14 .44 3.66 14.70 
     
 
Note: n = 200. Items 1-20 = Cyberaggression, Items 21-41 = Cybervictimization 
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APPENDIX C: ITEM CONFIGURATIONS FOR CES AND REVISED 3-FACTOR 
MODEL 
 
Table C.1  
 
CES Cyberaggression and Cybervictimization Items 
 
Item Cyberaggression Cybervictimization 
 
#1 
 
 
 
#2 
 
 
 
#3 
 
 
 
#4 
 
 
 
#5 
 
 
#6 
 
 
 
#7 
 
 
 
 
#8 
 
 
 
Have you posted an embarrassing 
picture of someone electronically 
where other people could see it?PH 
 
Have you posted a picture of 
someone electronically that they did 
not want others to see?PH 
 
Have you posted a picture 
electronically of someone doing 
something illegal?PH 
 
Have you sent a rude message to 
someone electronically?M 
 
 
Have you teased someone 
electronically?M 
 
Have you been mean to someone 
electronically?M 
 
 
Have you called someone mean 
names electronically?M 
 
 
 
Have you made fun of someone 
electronically?M 
 
Has someone distributed information 
electronically while pretending to be 
you?PH 
 
Has someone changed a picture of 
you in a negative way and posted it 
electronically?PH 
 
Has someone written mean messages 
about you publically electronically?PH 
 
 
Has someone logged into your 
electronic account and changed your 
information?PH 
 
Has someone posted a nude picture of 
you electronically?PH 
 
Has someone printed out an 
electronic conversation you had and 
then showed it to others?PH 
 
Have you completed an electronic 
survey that was supposed to remain 
private but the answers were sent to 
someone else?PH 
 
Has someone logged into your 
electronic account and pretended to 
be you?PH 
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CES Cyberaggression and Cybervictimization Items - Continued 
 
Item Cyberaggression Subscale Cybervictimization Subscale 
 
#9  
 
 
 
#10 
 
 
 
#11 
 
 
 
 
#12 
 
 
 
#13 
 
 
 
#14 
 
 
 
#15 
 
 
 
 
#16 
 
 
 
 
#17 
 
 
Have you cursed at someone 
electronically?M 
 
 
Have you sent an unwanted 
pornographic picture to someone 
electronically?UW 
 
Have you tried to meet someone in 
person that you talked to 
electronically who did not want to 
meet you in person?UW 
 
Have you sent an unwanted sexual 
message to someone 
electronically?UW 
 
Have you sent an unwanted nude or 
partially nude picture to someone 
electronically?UW 
 
Have you sent a message to a person 
electronically that claimed you would 
try to find out where they live?UW 
 
Have you tried to get information 
from someone you talked to 
electronically that they did not want 
to give?UW 
 
Have you sent a message 
electronically to a stranger requesting 
sex?UW 
 
 
Have you asked a stranger 
electronically about what they were 
wearing?UW 
 
Has someone posted an embarrassing 
picture of you electronically where 
other people could see it?PH 
 
Has someone called you mean names 
electronically?M 
 
 
Has someone been mean to you 
electronically?M 
 
 
 
Has someone cursed at you 
electronically?M 
 
 
Has someone made fun of you 
electronically?M 
 
 
Has someone teased you 
electronically?M 
 
 
Have you received a nude or partially 
nude picture that you did not want 
from someone you were talking to 
electronically?UW 
 
Have you received a pornographic 
picture that you did not want from 
someone electronically that was not 
spam?UW 
 
Have you received an unwanted 
sexual message from someone 
electronically?UW 
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CES Cyberaggression and Cybervictimization Items – Continued  
 
Item Cyberaggression Subscale Cybervictimization Subscale 
 
#18 
 
 
 
#19 
 
 
 
 
#20 
 
 
#21 
 
 
Have you pretended to be someone 
else while talking to someone 
electronically?D 
 
Has someone shared personal 
information with you electronically 
when you pretended to be someone 
else?D 
 
Have you lied about yourself to 
someone electronically?D 
 
--- 
 
Have you received an offensive 
picture electronically that was not 
spam?UW 
 
Has someone pretended to be 
someone else while talking to you 
electronically?D 
 
 
Has someone lied about themselves 
to you electronically?D 
 
Have you shared personal 
information with someone 
electronically and then later found the 
person was not who you thought it 
was?D 
 
 
Note. PH = Public Humiliation subscale, M = Malice subscale, UC = Unwanted Contact 
subscale, D = Deception subscale. 
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Revised 3-factor Cyberaggression Model Item Reconfigurations 
 
Sexual Cyberaggression 
1. Have you sent an unwanted pornographic picture to someone electronically? 
2. Have you tried to meet someone in person that you talked to electronically who 
did not want to meet you in person? 
3. Have you sent an unwanted sexual message to someone electronically? 
4. Have you sent an unwanted nude or partially nude picture to someone 
electronically? 
5. Have you sent a message electronically to a stranger requesting sex? 
 
Coercion 
1. Have you sent a message to a person electronically that claimed you would try to 
find out where they live? 
2. Have you tried to get information from someone you talked to electronically that 
they did not want to give? 
3. Have you asked a stranger electronically about what they are wearing? 
4. Have you pretended to be someone else while talking to someone electronically? 
5. Has someone shared personal information with you electronically when you 
pretended to be someone else? 
6. Have you lied about yourself to someone electronically? 
 
Direct Cyberaggression 
1. Have you sent a rude message to someone electronically? 
2. Have you teased someone electronically? 
3. Have you been mean to someone electronically? 
4. Have you called someone mean names electronically? 
5. Have you made fun of someone electronically? 
6. Have you cursed at someone electronically? 
7. Have you posted an embarrassing picture of someone electronically where other 
people could see it? 
8. Have you posted a picture of someone electronically that they did not want others 
to see? 
9. Have you posted a picture electronically of someone doing something illegal? 
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Revised 3-factor Cybervictimization Model Item Reconfigurations 
 
Sexual Cybervictimization 
1. Have you received a nude or partially nude picture that you did not want from 
someone you were talking to electronically? 
2. Have you received a pornographic picture that you did not want from someone 
electronically that was not spam? 
3. Have you received an unwanted sexual message from someone electronically? 
4. Have you received an offensive picture electronically that was not spam? 
 
Direct Cybervictimization 
1. Has someone called you mean names electronically? 
2. Has someone been mean to you electronically? 
3. Has someone cursed at you electronically? 
4. Has someone made fun of you electronically? 
5. Has someone teased you electronically? 
 
Defamation 
1. Has someone distributed information electronically while pretending to be you? 
2. Has someone changed a picture of you in a negative way and posted it 
electronically? 
3. Has someone written mean messages about you publicly electronically? 
4. Has someone logged into your electronic account and changed your information? 
5. Has someone posted a nude picture of you electronically? 
6. Has someone printed out an electronic conversation you had and then showed it to 
others? 
7. Has someone logged into your electronic account and pretended to be you? 
8. Has someone posted an embarrassing picture of you electronically where other 
people could see it? 
9. Has someone pretended to be someone else while talking to you electronically? 
10. Has someone lied about themselves to you electronically? 
11. Have you shared personal information with someone electronically and then later 
found the person was not who you thought it was? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 107 
 
APPENDIX D: ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR CES MODEL REVISIONS  
D.1. CYBERAGGRESSION MODEL REVISIONS 
We used the following analytic method to investigate a revised model solution for 
the CES cyberaggression model: 
 Step 1: Conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) for the high school 
 sample to uncover the underlying structure of the CES cyberaggression items. 
 Step 2: Integrated EFA results with theoretical considerations and item 
 intercorrelations to conduct an EFA with target rotation for the high school 
 sample. The Target EFA places additional restrictions on model parameters 
 compared to a  traditional EFA where items are partially specified to serve as 
 indicators for the proposed latent variable structure. 
 Step 3: Performed a CFA for both college and high school samples with the 
 revised model solution as informed by the previous two steps. A CFA is more 
 restrictive compared to the Target EFA where items are now fully specified to 
 serve as indicators for the proposed latent variable structure. 
Step 1 Results: Findings from the 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-factor EFA solutions for the high 
school sample are presented in Table D.1. Results indicated that a three-factor model best 
fit the CES cyberaggression items for high school students which likely reflects the 
strong correlation (r = .99) between the “unwanted contact” and “deception” 
cyberaggression subscales in the originally hypothesized four-factor CFA solution.  
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Table D.1 
Goodness-of-Fit Indicators of Models for CES Cyberaggression Items 
 
Model 
 
 
MLM χ2 
 
df 
 
RMSEA 
 
CFI 
 
SRMR 
Exploratory Analyses: Step 1 
EFA High School 
     1-Factor 
     2-Factor 
     3-Factor 
     4-Factor 
 
Exploratory Analyses: Step 2 
 
 
700.71 
459.34 
240.97 
355.46 
 
 
170 
151 
133 
116 
 
 
 
.13 
.10 
.06 
.10 
 
 
.52 
.72 
.90 
.78 
 
 
.14 
.08 
.06 
.05 
     Target EFA High School 3- 
     Factor## 
 
238.72* 131 .06 .90 .05 
 
*p < .001 
##“Sexual cyberaggression,” “direct cyberaggression,” and “coercion” subscales. 
 
Step 2 Results: We examined item content and inter-item correlations in an attempt to 
identify new item configurations based on the proposed three-factor solution. Upon 
examining item content, several items included on the “unwanted contact” subscale 
contained sexually related content (e.g., “Have you sent an unwanted sexual message to 
someone electronically?” and “Have you sent a message electronically to a stranger 
requesting sex?”). Research on aggression has identified sexual aggression to be a 
construct unique from other commonly identified forms of aggression such as physical 
and relational aggression. This is likely a result of both theoretical considerations 
surrounding personalities and attitudes of sexual aggressors compared to aggressors more 
generally as well as real-world legal implications of committing a sexually-related crime 
(Vega & Malamuth, 2007). Research has also identified a growing trend of 
communicating sexually-related material in the cyber realm, commonly referred to as 
“sexting” (Dake, Price, Maziarz, & Ward, 2012). Although sexting behaviors were 
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initially theorized as voluntary acts, sexting can transition into cyberaggressive behavior 
if an individual utilizes peer pressure, sends unwanted sexual messages/pictures to 
another, or intentionally forwards sexual messages/pictures to unintended parties (Dake 
et al., 2012). Lastly, observed inter-item correlations among sexually related items in our 
high school and college samples indicated mostly moderate to strong correlations (rs = 
.12 – .89), although items 10 and 16 weakly correlated with all CES cyberaggression 
items. Considering both theory proposed in the traditional aggression and 
cyberaggression literature and the observed inter-item correlations in our sample, it may 
make conceptual sense to interpret sexually-related forms of aggression in the cyber 
realm as a distinct construct. 
EFA factor loadings also suggested that the items originally included on the 
“malice” subscale strongly covaried with each other and the “public humiliation” items. 
The content of these items reflect more direct forms of cyberaggression (e.g., “Have you 
sent a rude message to someone electronically?” and “Have you posted an embarrassing 
picture of someone electronically where other people could see it?”). The remaining CES 
cyberaggression items included three items on the original “unwanted contact” subscale 
(i.e., “Have you sent a message to a person electronically that claimed you would try to 
find out where they live?,” “Have you tried to get information from someone you talked 
to electronically that they did not want to give?,” and “Have you asked a stranger 
electronically about what they are wearing?”) and the “deception” subscale items. These 
items all generally appear to utilize coercive tactics to obtain information that the 
recipient did not want to originally provide via electronic communication.  
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Utilizing these revised item configurations to form “sexual cyberaggression,” 
“direct cyberaggression,” and “coercion” subscales, results from the three-factor Target 
EFA solution for the high school sample supported this latent construct conceptualization 
as incremental fit indices met or approached cut-off recommendations (Table D.1).  
D.2. CYBERVICTIMIZATION MODEL REVISIONS  
We used the following analytic method to investigate a revised model solution for 
the CES cybervictimization model: 
Step 1: Conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) for the high school 
sample to uncover the unrestricted, underlying structure of the CES 
cybervictimization items. 
 Step 2: Integrated EFA results with theoretical considerations and item 
 intercorrelations to conduct an EFA with target rotation for the high school 
 sample.  
Step 3: Performed a CFA for both college and high school samples with the 
revised model solution as informed by the previous two analytical steps. 
Step 1 Results: Findings from the 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-factor EFA solutions for the high 
school sample are presented in Table D.2. Results suggested that a four-factor model 
would best fit the CES cybervictimization items for high school students. Upon 
examining all item factor loadings, item 7 (“Have you completed an electronic survey 
that was supposed to remain private but the answers were sent to someone else?”) did not 
load on any factor in any of the potential solutions. This is likely due to low endorsement 
in the high school sample (M = .07, SD = .29) as well as item content unrelated to a  
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Table D.2 
Goodness-of-Fit Indicators of Models for CES Cybervictimization Items 
 
Model 
 
 
MLM χ2 
 
df 
 
RMSEA 
 
CFI 
 
SRMR 
Exploratory Analyses: Step 1 
EFA High School 
     1-Factor 
     2-Factor 
     3-Factor 
     4-Factor 
 
Exploratory Analyses: Step 2 
 
 
738.42 
482.70 
450.96 
350.94 
 
 
189 
169 
150 
132 
 
 
 
.12 
.10 
.10 
.09 
 
 
.58 
.76 
.77 
.83 
 
 
.11 
.08 
.06 
.05 
Target EFA High School 4-Factor# 
 
Exploratory Analyses: Step 3 
     CFA 4-Factor Solution High   
     School## 
 
Exploratory Analyses: Step 4 
     Target EFA High School 3- 
     Factor### 
 
213.59* 
 
 
 
269.12* 
 
 
 
234.42* 
112 
 
 
 
160 
 
 
 
126 
.06 
 
 
 
.06 
 
 
 
.06 
.92 
 
 
 
.91 
 
 
 
.92 
.04 
 
 
 
.07 
 
 
 
.04 
 
*p < .001 
#Removed CES cybervictimization item #7.  
##“Public Humiliation” and “Deception” subscales correlated r = .87. 
###“Sexual cybervictimization,” “direct cybervictimization,” and “defamation” subscales. 
 
cyberaggressive act (e.g., intention of the survey answers being sent to someone else may 
not be interpreted as aggression). As such, this item was removed in subsequent models.  
 Step 2 Results: We examined item content and inter-item correlations in an 
attempt to identify potential item configurations based on the proposed 4-factor solution. 
Theoretical considerations were made to be consistent with how latent constructs were 
conceptualized to represent cyberaggression. That is, all cybervictimization items that 
included sexually-related content were theorized to represent a sexual cybervictimization 
latent variable; this involved specifying one item from the “public humiliation” factor 
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(“Has someone posted a nude picture of you electronically?”) on the “unwanted contact” 
subscale. All other items as well as item factor loadings supported the originally 
hypothesized four-factor model. Thus, we ran the reconfigured model along with item #7 
removed from the solution. The results from the Target EFA lent further support for the 
four-factor model as indicated by incremental fit indices meeting recommended cut-off 
values (Table D.2). 
 Step 3 Results: Given evidentiary support from our EFA and Target EFA 
solutions, we performed a revised four-factor CFA solution for the high school sample. 
Although the Satorra-Bentler chi-square was significant, incremental fit indices met or 
approached recommended cut-off values. Of note, however, the “public humiliation” and 
“deception” subscales correlated at r = .87 and the “public humiliation” and “malice” 
subscales correlated at r = .82. As previously mentioned, strong correlations between 
factors may potentially result in multicollinearity in a solution due to poor discriminative 
validity between latent variables (Kenny, 2012). Considering these strong correlations 
between factors, and to propose a cybervictimization model solution consistent with the 
revised cyberaggression factor solution, we additionally explored a potential three-factor 
model for the cybervictimization items. 
 Step 4 Results: We conducted a Target EFA based on the proposed three-factor 
solution. Items were partially specified to load on three factors (i.e., “sexual 
cybervictimization,” “direct cybervictimization,” and “defamation” subscales). Items 
originally on the “unwanted contact” subscale were all included on the renamed “sexual 
cybervictimization” subscale to better represent their item content. Items on the original 
“malice” subscale remained in the renamed “direct cybervictimization” subscale. Items 
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on the “public humiliation” and “deception” subscales were combined to form the novel 
“defamation” subscale based on the observed strong correlation between factors in Step 
3. To further support this revision, our EFA analyses indicated that the “defamation” 
items all loaded on the same factor. That is, all items concerned false pretenses being 
claimed about the cybervictim (e.g., “Has someone changed a picture of you in a negative 
way and posted it electronically?”) or the cyberaggressor (e.g., “Has someone lied about 
themselves to you electronically?”). The three-factor Target EFA supported these 
revisions for our high school sample (Table D.2). 
